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DEAL STRUCTURE 
Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn 
ABSTRACT—Modern commercial contracts—those governing mergers and 
acquisitions and financial derivatives, for instance—have become 
structurally complex and interconnected. Yet contract law largely ignores 
structural complexity. This Article develops a theory of “contractual 
structuralism” to explain the important role of structure in every aspect of 
contract law, from the design of a contract to courts’ interpretation and 
enforcement. 
For generations, scholars have debated whether a court should consider 
only the text of a contract or also consider broader context to determine 
parties’ intent. More recently, scholars have shown that parties can choose 
between textual and contextual interpretation by drafting a contract provision 
as a rule or a standard. Rules signal that parties have fully thought through 
the issues and a court should interpret textually, and standards signal the need 
for further contextual exploration. 
This Article builds upon that pioneering work to make two 
contributions to the literature. First, it provides the first comprehensive 
account of structural complexity in modern contracting, and explains how 
modern contract designers use structure to advance their goals. Second, it 
shows how the design of contract structure can influence interpretation. 
Contracts have grown—in scope, length, and complexity—and provisions 
are no longer strictly rules or strictly standards. Rather, they bleed into and 
interact with one another, complicating parties’ ability to always pair 
textualist enforcement with a rule and contextualist enforcement with a 
standard. Tweaking deal structure provides contract designers with another 
way, beyond using a rule or standard, to nudge courts toward a particular 
interpretive mode. Specifically, structural isolation of provisions—a 
modular contract structure—is required for the kind of toggling between 
textualism and contextualism that other scholars have envisioned. 
Understanding how a contract’s parts are put together—the structure of the 
contract—is important to understanding how to design contracts and can 
greatly influence how courts interpret contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Delaware courts halted a $2.5 billion merger when one party’s 
failure to comply with a single section of the merger agreement led to “a 
cascade effect on other contractual provisions.”1 Cooper Tire and numerous 
recent cases like it show that modern contracts are increasingly complex.2 
 
 1 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2014 WL 
5654305, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014) (explaining that section 5.1(a) of the Merger Agreement 
imposes the requirement that Cooper shall conduct its business in the ordinary course of business 
and that requirement had a cascade effect on the material adverse effect and marketing period 
provisions). 
 2 Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. 
REV. 1109 (noting that complexity is one of the main causes of the subprime mortgage crisis); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 
(noting that modern securities and derivatives deals are extremely complex); John C. Coates, IV, 
Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years of Deals 14 (Harvard Law Sch. 
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Working Paper No. 333, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019 [https://perma.cc/9R9A-D72Z] 
(describing the growth in length and complexity of M&A contracts—with length growing from 
approximately thirty-five to eighty-eight pages in twenty years, and complexity rising approximately 
ten grade levels); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Multi-Stage Contracting in Complex Transactions 
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From humble apartment leases to multibillion-dollar merger agreements, 
many contemporary contracts are now made up of complex webs of 
provisions. How contract drafters join together those provisions—the 
contract’s structure—can fundamentally change every aspect of a contract, 
from design to performance to enforcement. Thus far, contracts scholarship 
has overlooked the exceptionally important role of structure. This Article 
investigates structure’s role in contract theory, doctrine, and practice, and 
develops a theory of “contractual structuralism” to bring fresh insight to 
classic questions of contract interpretation and design. 
Cooper Tire aptly illustrates the complications that arise in a world of 
structural complexity.3 The case began when Apollo, a major tire company, 
agreed to buy another tire company, Cooper, for $2.5 billion. A series of 
labor disputes caused Apollo to delay closing the deal, and Cooper filed suit 
in Delaware to compel Apollo to close. In litigation, Cooper alleged that 
Apollo had not used its “reasonable best efforts” to resolve the labor disputes 
that had delayed closing. Because the parties had drafted a structurally 
integrated agreement—that is, one where provisions relied heavily on each 
other to work—the case called on the court to interpret a thickly 
interconnected web of contract provisions. The court considered not only 
Apollo’s best efforts obligation, but also Cooper’s, as well as  numerous 
other provisions within the merger agreement.4
 
In the end, the court found 
that Apollo was not obligated to close the deal.5 That result, however, could 
have easily been different had the contract drafters linked provisions within 
the agreement differently, such as by isolating Apollo’s best efforts provision 
from other parts of the agreement.6 
Cases like Cooper Tire expose the dramatic practical importance of 
understanding contract structure in modern markets. But the sheer size of 
 
2 (Jan. 2, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) 
(noting that “some agreements are simply too complex or time-consuming to be completed in a 
single stage. . . . [T]he purpose of agreement in the first stage is to address complexity and set a 
distinct stage for expert agents, rather than to protect specific investments under an incomplete 
contract”). 
 3 For the judicial opinion, letter order, and transcript, see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2014 WL 
5654305; Letter Order to Counsel, Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. 
Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2013 WL 5977140 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2013); and Transcript of Post-Trial Oral 
Argument, Partial Post-Trial Bench Rulings of the Court, Oral Argument on Plaintiff/Counterclaim 
Defendant’s Motion for Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, and Bench Rulings of the Court, 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 2013 WL 
6735067 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2013). 
 4 See Peter Lyons et al., Reasonable Best Efforts: Cold Comfort to Sellers, M&A LAW., Jan. 
2014, at 1, 5–6 (2014). 
 5 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2014 WL 5654305, at *19. 
 6 See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
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contemporary contractual disputes is not the only reason structure matters. 
The complexity of modern contract structure also highlights new questions 
in contract law. How do related provisions across multiple contracts interact 
with one another? How should they? How can contract designers and 
interpreters use contract structure to achieve their economic and adjudicative 
goals? 
Contract scholars have completely overlooked these questions. Rather, 
they remain preoccupied with a classic, provision-by-provision analysis of 
contracts.7 The famous contracts case Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. 
International Sales Corp. is a classic example.8 The parties asked the 
Southern District of New York to resolve the meaning of a single word—
“chicken”—in their simple purchasing agreement.9 The plaintiff argued that 
“chicken” meant only choice young frying chickens, while the defendant 
countered that it could also mean old stewing chickens.10 In this case, as in 
many classic cases, the court’s interpretive task was discrete: Should it use 
extrinsic evidence to interpret a single ambiguous word?11 
Many important and central questions of contract law build on that 
tradition of provision-by-provision analysis. Frigaliment considered the parol 
evidence question, a question that has been long debated by contract 
scholars: Should courts look beyond the specific provision in question and 
consider extrinsic evidence in interpreting a contract? Most scholars have 
argued that courts must take one of two interpretive routes. Some have 
argued that courts must review only the plain meaning of a written term (a 
textual approach), while others have insisted that courts consult the broader, 
unwritten context of the transaction (a contextual approach).12 Over time, 
textualism has become synonymous with a straightforward and relatively 
 
 7 See infra Part I. 
 8 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
 9 Id. at 117. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 118. 
 12 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract 
Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2014) (noting that “[i]n a 
textualist regime, generalist courts cannot choose to consider context; in a contextualist regime, these 
courts must consider it. Thus, text or context”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 931–32 (2010) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux] (laying out some basic differences between textualist and contextualist 
interpretation regimes); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) [hereinafter Schwartz & Scott, Limits of Contract 
Law] (setting out a modern formalist/textualist theory of contract law and contractual interpretation). 
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low-cost approach to interpretation, whereas contextualism is seen as 
complicated and expensive.13 
Recent work continues to focus on single provisions, although some 
scholars have made important strides in moving the old debates forward. 
Professors Robert Scott and George Triantis have argued, compellingly, that 
parties can design contracts in anticipation of later enforcement.14 Their work 
implies that rule-like terms can tee up a textualist interpretive approach, 
while standard-like terms can nudge courts toward a contextualist 
approach.15
 But Scott and Triantis’s work, too, frames contract designers’ 
choice in binary terms: a drafter may use either a precise rule-like contract 
term or a vague standard-like term. 
The assumption that contracts are comprised of independent terms 
fundamentally overlooks a sea change in transactional practice: parties now 
often memorialize their intentions in numerous provisions and, indeed, 
multiple contracts. As such, modern contracts are fundamentally different 
from the relatively simple contracts that motivated classic questions. A 
growing body of empirical scholarship has noted that modern contracts have 
grown substantially in complexity. They are longer,16 tackle more difficult 
issues,17 and are harder to read and understand.18 Most importantly, modern 
 
 13 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain 
Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contract Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998) 
[hereinafter Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule]; Schwartz & Scott, Limits of Contract Law, supra 
note 12, at 598. 
 14 See generally, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract 
Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (noting that investment in ex ante contract design can reduce ex 
post contract enforcement costs, and that less investment in ex ante contract design can increase ex 
post contract enforcement costs); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 
22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006) (discussing the role of back-end contract interpretation in 
influencing how parties design contracts ex ante). For a discussion of the rules/standards debate in 
public law, see infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 15 Scott & Triantis, supra note 14. 
 16 Coates, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that the length of mergers and acquisitions contracts has 
grown from approximately thirty-five to eighty-eight pages in twenty years). 
 17 Choi & Triantis, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that “some agreements are simply too complex to 
be completed in a single stage” and that completing a contract in multiple stages allows parties to 
engage subject matter specialists and advisors). 
 18 Coates, supra note 2, at 14 (noting an increase in contract length over twenty years, and also 
that, in the same time period, the reading level needed to understand mergers and acquisitions 
contracts has grown from post-graduate grade twenty to post-graduate grade thirty); Jeremy R. 
McClane, Boilerplate and the Impact of Disclosure in Securities Dealmaking 38 (Oct. 26, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) (measuring the 
readability of securities disclosure and noting that “a Gunning Fog score of 8 is considered 
appropriate for most audiences, whereas a score above 18 is considered unreadable by most 
audiences. The average Gunning Fog score for entire prospectuses in the dataset is 21.6”). 
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contracts are structurally complex19—a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
contract might use interlinked documents and provisions to express 
complicated earnout, indemnification, and escrow provisions. As a result, 
parties complete contracts in stages,20 create deals that span multiple 
different related contracts,21 or segregate complex issues into easier-to-digest 
modules22 to make modern contracts work. Those developments in contracts’ 
structural complexity mean that modern contracts have outgrown classic 
questions of interpretation and design. 
Modern contracts demand macro-level, structural inquiry before those 
classic provision-by-provision, micro-level questions are addressed. This 
Article takes a fresh approach to studying contracts by tackling, for the first 
time, the questions of how contracts are structured on a macro, multi-
provision level and why structure is important. This Article’s analysis builds 
on literatures in contract design, modularity in both public and private law, 
and contract interpretation to develop a new theory of “contractual 
structuralism.” Contractual structuralism is the simple (yet thus far 
unexplored) idea that how a contract is put together matters in every part of 
that contract’s life cycle: design, performance, and enforcement. 
This Article’s argument unfolds as follows. Part I shows that, because 
contract structure is increasingly complex, the old rules/standards and 
text/context paradigms for understanding contract law are inadequate. It also 
draws on recent literature about contractual complexity to shed light on the 
design decisions that modern contract drafters face, and shows that 
understanding a contract’s structure is now a necessary first step to tackling 
questions of design and interpretation. 
Part II introduces the theory of contractual structuralism—a new way 
to think about contracts. It provides, for the first time, a comprehensive 
 
 19 Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order of Innovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV. 281, 297 
(2016) (describing the complex contractual arrangements that govern alliance relationships). 
 20 Choi & Triantis, supra note 2 (describing the process by which parties complete complex 
commercial contracts in stages in order to manage complexity). 
 21 See generally Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016) (describing deals that are memorialized 
in many interrelated contracts and agreements as “unbundled bargains,” and arguing that unbundling  
a bargain has implications for deal design and contract interpretation). 
 22 Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2006) (analyzing interaction between standardization and 
customization in contract drafting, and defining legal modularity as “the practice of creating a legal 
document by selecting and cobbling together terms from a source compendium or from different 
sources”); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. 
L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006) (discussing modularity within individual contracts); George G. Triantis, 
Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 204–06 (2013) (describing how modular contracts improve collaboration in 
creating standardized contract provisions). 
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theory of how contract drafters design different contractual systems as 
modular (provisions are separate from one another, and each isolated part 
can be manipulated without affecting the others), integrated (provisions are 
highly connected to each other, and rely on each other to work), or a 
combination of the two. Through examples, this Part shows how the theory 
of contractual structuralism adds a new dimension to understanding contract 
design. 
Part III discusses implications for contract design and enforcement. 
Other scholars have shown that parties can toggle between textual or 
contextual interpretation of their contracts by using rule-like and standard-
like terms.23 This Part argues that this toggling ability depends, first and 
foremost, on how the contract is structured. Only when provisions are 
carefully cabined from one another in a modular structure can contract 
designers pair rules with textualism or standards with contextualism. This 
Part also discusses how courts can recognize contract structure, how 
contractual structuralism affects contract policy, and presents preliminary 
evidence on how parties are already harnessing contract structure to privately 
order dispute resolution. 
I. CONTRACT DESIGN IN A COMPLEX WORLD 
In legislation, treaties, private contracts, and many other dealmaking 
areas, drafters must make a decision between using a rule or a standard to 
express meaning. Rules—“deliver the goods on October 1, at 7 p.m. Eastern, 
unless it is already dark, in which case, deliver the next day”—are more time-
consuming to negotiate and draft, but easier to enforce. Standards—“deliver 
the goods at a reasonable time”—are the opposite: they are easier to draft, 
but harder to enforce. 
In both public and private law, the trade-off between rules and standards 
is widely understood to be the central decision that drafters must make.24 But 
modern contract drafters face design decisions beyond the traditional rules 
and standards paradigm. While rules and standards remain relevant, contract 
drafters must also make a broader decision about the overall structure of the 
contract. That is, because almost all contracts are collections of provisions, 
drafters must also make decisions about how to put those provisions together 
into a cohesive working system. The connection between provisions is what 
this Article calls contract structure. 
 
 23 See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 14, at 816–22 (discussing how rule-like and standard-like 
terms can each be efficient depending on whether the parties want to incur front-end or back-end costs). 
 24 For a discussion of rules and standards in private law, see id. at 839–52, and infra note 28 and 
accompanying text. For a discussion of the same in public law, see infra notes 25–26 and 
accompanying text. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
286 
This Part shows how modern contracts have outgrown the classic 
questions of contract law. Section A begins with a brief overview of the rules 
and standards paradigm, which is an apt, if two-dimensional, way to 
understand contract drafting. In particular, the rules and standards paradigm 
is overly focused on the trade-off that contract drafters face on a micro-level, 
provision-by-provision basis. Section B briefly overviews the classic 
text/context debate and influential recent research by Scott and Triantis, 
which argues that parties can choose between textualism and contextualism 
by using either rule-like or standard-like terms. Section C shows that, in light 
of recent developments, contract drafters must continue to make important 
choices between rules and standards, but also think carefully about how to 
weave multiple provisions together. 
A. The Classic Design Decision: Rules and Standards 
In public law, the trade-off between using rules and standards is well-
understood.25 Professors Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett recently 
provided a vivid example of how rules and standards play out in everyday 
traffic laws.26 Lawmakers can choose between crafting a rule (“drive no 
faster than 45 miles per hour”) or a standard (“drive reasonably”). Ex ante, a 
rule is harder to draft: it requires that lawmakers consider a variety of factors 
that might play a role in determining the correct speed limit. Should the speed 
limit be reduced when there is a curve in the road? Should it be reduced in a 
school zone? Ex post, however, a rule is quite easy is enforce: those who 
drive at 46 miles per hour have clearly violated the rule and can be ticketed. 
Moreover, rules require more granularity and more precision—a precise 
speed limit that makes sense for a rural interstate may not work well for a 
school zone. 
 
 25 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
561 (1992) (providing a law-and-economics account of when commands should be standards and 
when they should be rules); Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 101 (1997) (discussing the interaction between using rules and standards to promulgate 
law, and using norms to support nonlegal conduct); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA 
L. REV. 379 (1985) (discussing the rules and standards in the context of interpreting constitutional 
law); Shavell, supra note 14 (discussing the role of contract interpretation on the back end, and how 
it adds value to contracts on the front end); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. 
REV. 953 (1995) (providing an overview of the classic rules/standards framework and discussing the 
issues with rules); see also MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 51–54 (3d ed. 1983) (discussing the classic dispute between Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Benjamin Cardozo, in which the two disagree about the way to craft an 
obligation for a driver who comes to a railroad crossing. Holmes argues that drivers should stop and 
look—a rule. Cardozo argues that drivers should operate with reasonable caution—a standard). 
 26 See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards, 
92 IND. L.J. 1401 (2017) (arguing that “microdirectives”—tailored rules where tailoring is aided by 
artificial intelligence—will overtake both rules and standards as a drafting method). 
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A standard poses the opposite cost and benefit. It is easier to draft ex 
ante, because it requires little investigation on the part of the drafter. In the 
traffic context, it would be easy for a drafter to simply post signs everywhere 
that require drivers to “drive reasonably.” But interpreting “reasonableness” 
is tricky—individual drivers likely have different determinations of what is 
“reasonable,” which makes the standard harder to enforce. One might easily 
imagine the arguments to be had in traffic court over what is considered 
“reasonable” by police officers and by drivers, which make the enforcement 
of standards far more challenging. 
The decision to use a rule or a standard not only affects precision and 
ease of enforcement, but also the overall costs of a given provision. In 
drafting traffic laws, for example, a rule takes longer to draft, and requires 
more investigation up front to get right. It is, however, easy to follow, so it 
imposes lower decision costs on individual drivers27—drivers need not make 
independent determinations of reasonableness and can instead simply follow 
the posted instructions. Rules are also easy to enforce, which translates into 
lower cost for enforcers and the judiciary. Standards, however, are cheap to 
write—but drafters are essentially pushing the burden of investigating and 
judging traffic conditions, and determining a “reasonable” speed, onto 
individual drivers, enforcers, and adjudicators. Thus, it is more expensive for 
drivers to comply with standards than with rules because they must each bear 
the cost of investigation and determination. The drawn-out arguments in 
traffic court, too, greatly increase the ex post costs of enforcing the standard. 
Largely echoing the public law understanding, a rich literature in 
contract theory also examines how the rule/standard choice can affect the 
cost of drafting private contracts.28 The overall cost of drafting a contract is 
understood to include both the ex ante cost of drafting and the ex post cost 
of enforcement (as well as judicial error costs).29 Not surprisingly, using a 
 
 27 Id. at 1408 (noting that “[r]ules do, however, impose lower decision costs when behavior is 
frequent and homogenous”). 
 28 See, e.g., Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case 
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852 (2010) (“[D]rawing on the line of scholarship 
that analyzes the rules-standards dichotomy in the design of legal rules, recent work frames the 
choice between vague and precise contract terms as a tradeoff in information costs: precise contract 
provisions raise contracting costs on the front end, but reduce enforcement costs at the back end.”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583–
84 (2005) (defining the cost of a contract as the ex ante negotiating and drafting costs, plus the 
probability of litigation multiplied by the sum of the parties’ litigation costs, the judiciary’s litigation 
costs, and judicial error costs). 
 29 Judge Richard Posner formalizes this concept in a slightly more complicated formula, C = x 
+ p(x)[y + z + e(x, y, z)], where C is the transaction costs of a contract, x is the ex ante contracting 
costs, p is the probability of litigation, y is the parties’ litigation costs, z is the judiciary’s cost, and e 
is judicial error costs. Posner, supra note 28, at 1583–84. 
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rule—which costs more to draft up front—reduces enforcement costs down 
the line, because rules reduce the probability of misunderstanding, dispute, 
and the time spent on litigation when disputes do arise. In contrast, drafting 
a standard is relatively low-cost ex ante, but opens the door to 
misunderstanding and expensive litigation ex post.30
 
Standards also open the door to greater judicial error costs. While 
parties can disagree—and litigate—both rules and standards, standards are, 
by definition, open to broader interpretation. The issues surrounding judicial 
competence and bias have been well-documented by others.31 It is worth 
noting that in the context of complex commercial contracts, parties are even 
more concerned about judicial error: sophisticated parties may fear, for 
example, that state judges outside of Delaware lack the specialized 
knowledge to understand and adjudicate complex business issues.32 Thus, 
drafting a standard in a complex commercial setting not only introduces a 
larger risk of judicial error than drafting a rule, but the error introduced 
through adjudication may be larger (and higher stakes) than in other 
contracting settings. 
B. The Classic Text/Context Divide 
While the rules/standards debate has dominated discussions about 
contract design, the text/context debate has dominated discussions about 
contract interpretation. For decades, contract theorists and courts have been 
divided over whether to admit extrinsic evidence in interpreting disputed 
contracts—the parol evidence debate.33 While textualists argue that 
 
 30 Id. at 1597; see also Choi & Triantis, supra note 28 (discussing the use of standards as a 
rational cost-minimizing choice if the probability of back-end enforcement is low); Scott & Triantis, 
supra note 14 (identifying the trade-off between front-end drafting costs and back-end litigation 
costs); Shavell, supra note 14 (discussing how the possibility of back-end interpretation can affect 
front-end contract drafting). 
 31 See, e.g., Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 17, 20–21 
(2018) (noting that rationality is dynamic and endogenous, and that laws and policies shape humans’ 
views of what is rational); Casey & Niblett, supra note 26, at 1408 & nn.19–21, 1409 (describing 
how “adjudicator competency and bias complicate [the] simple model of error costs” and noting that 
“[e]x post adjudication may suffer from hindsight bias and from biases based on the personal 
characteristics of particular individuals” (footnotes omitted) (citing Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive 
Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998), and Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial 
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009))). 
 32 Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of Uncertainty, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 
291–92 (2015) (noting that corporate defendants prefer federal courts and believe that federal courts 
are better equipped to hear and decide complex issues of corporate and securities law). 
 33 The parol evidence rule is a substantive rule of law that states that courts “will refuse to use 
evidence of the parties’ prior negotiations in order to interpret a written contract unless the writing is (1) 
incomplete, (2) ambiguous, or (3) the product of fraud, mistake, or a similar bargaining defect.” Posner, 
The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 13, at 534. As Professor Posner notes, there are hard and soft 
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generalist courts should not use context to interpret a disputed contract, 
contextualists argue that courts should (and must).34 Each method has its own 
benefits and shortcomings, overviewed briefly here. 
Textualism begins with two fairly uncontroversial views. First, 
“although accurate judicial interpretations are desirable, . . . no interpretative 
theory can justify devoting infinite resources to achieve interpretive 
accuracy.”35 In other words, textualism has an efficiency argument: it 
suggests that there is a benefit to searching for the right answer, but a cost, 
too. Second, textualism recognizes that both ex ante contract design and ex 
post enforcement and interpretation are costly. Those ex ante and ex post 
costs are inexorably linked: more investment on the front end reduces back-
end costs, and less investment (and less specificity) on the front end increases 
back-end litigation costs.36 Textualists argue that when drafting contracts, 
sophisticated parties make a considered decision about whether to allocate 
more time and money to the front-end drafting costs, or whether to roll the 
dice on back-end litigation costs.37 As a result, they have already 
“embed[ded] as much or as little of the contractual context as they wish in a 
written, integrated contract.”38 Because they have already made this trade-
off, sophisticated parties prefer textualist interpretations of contracts: if they 
had wanted courts to examine more context when interpreting a contract, 
they would have added the context ex ante. 
It should come as no surprise that textualists prefer that courts default 
to a plain meaning rule and use a hard parol evidence rule that “restricts 
courts to a narrow evidentiary base when identifying the contract’s terms.”39 
 
interpretations of the parol evidence rule, “each of which turns on the use of extrinsic evidence to 
determine whether any of the exceptions apply.” Id. 
 34 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12, at 25–26 (setting out the basic differences between 
textualism and contextualism, and describing the two modes of interpretation as binary, with one 
excluding the other); Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 12 (discussing 
differences between textualist and contextualist interpretation regimes); Schwartz & Scott, Limits of 
Contract Law, supra note 12 (arguing that textualism is the appropriate way to interpret commercial 
contracts between sophisticated parties). 
 35 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 12, at 930. 
 36 Posner, supra note 28, at 1583–84 (discussing contracting costs as a combination of front- 
and back-end costs); Scott & Triantis, supra note 14, at 836 (noting that the “resolution of this 
tradeoff [between front-end and back-end costs] in each contracting instance determines the parties’ 
optimal choice between precise and vague terms”). 
 37 Choi & Triantis, supra note 28, at 852. 
 38 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12, at 26. 
 39 Id.; see also Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 12, at 932 (noting 
that a formalist or textualist interpretation “embodies a hard parol evidence rule, retains the plain 
meaning rule, gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger clauses[, also called integration 
clauses], and, in general, permits the resolution of many interpretation disputes by summary 
judgment”). 
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The plain meaning rule “supposes the parties to be communicating in a 
standard language,” rather than admitting extrinsic evidence to show that 
when parties said X, they actually meant Y, because in their private or 
technical language, X actually meant Y.40 A plain meaning rule prescribes that 
X means X. 
In contrast, contextualists argue that courts need to consider extrinsic 
evidence in contract interpretation in dealing with both unsophisticated and 
sophisticated contract parties.41 When a contract party is unsophisticated—
such as in mass-market clickwrap terms and conditions—context should be 
considered to protect those unsophisticated, passive parties from exploitation 
through take-it-or-leave-it contract terms. When parties are sophisticated, 
contextualists argue that they may be communicating in a private industry-
standard language that is not plain on its face.42 Thus, extrinsic evidence from 
the parties’ course of dealing should be considered in a contract 
interpretation dispute so that the nuances of that private language can be 
ascertained. In fact, “willfully restricting a court’s access to the trove of 
information bearing on the parties’ real relationship degrades judicial 
interpretation and frustrates the parties’ efforts to govern their transactions 
efficiently.”43 
Contextualists prefer a soft parol evidence rule, one that uses extrinsic 
evidence to determine whether the exceptions to the parol evidence rule 
apply.44 One exception to the parol evidence rule is that when a contract is 
deemed incomplete, extrinsic evidence can be used to explain terms. 
Applying the hard parol evidence rule, if a contract is complete “on its 
face”—for example, if it is long and detailed, covers many contingencies, 
and contains an integration clause that states that the contract is complete—
then courts will not admit extrinsic evidence.45 In contrast, contextualists 
might not presumptively declare such a contract complete, and might look 
 
 40 Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 12, at 932; see, e.g., Abramov 
v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 17-cv-1860, 2018 WL 1252105 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2018) (dismissing a 
complaint alleging that Home Depot breached an express warranty by using the term “4x4” to denote 
lumber that was actually of different dimensions on the grounds that in industry usage “4x4” was 
regularly used to refer to such sized wood). 
 41 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12, at 27. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, supra note 13, at 534–35. 
 45 Id. (noting that “[t]he harder courts declare a writing complete if it looks complete ‘on its 
face.’ Writings generally look complete if they are long and detailed, or at least contain unconditional 
language, cover many contingencies, or at least the most important contingencies, and contain a 
clause, such as a merger clause, which says that the contract is complete” (citing E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 474 (2d ed. 1990))). 
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instead for extrinsic evidence that suggests that the contract is incomplete.46 
Professor Eric Posner notes that “[i]n practice . . . courts adopting this soft 
version of the completeness exception generally admit all relevant extrinsic 
evidence, because any inconsistent extrinsic evidence suggests . . . that the 
contract is incomplete.”47 
In recent years, a rich literature has arisen around textualist and 
contextualist interpretations of contracts.48 Commentators have also argued 
that jurisdictions have adopted different methods of approaching contract 
interpretation—New York courts (and many others) take a textualist 
approach, while California courts veer contextualist.49 
One question that perennially haunts the textualism/contextualism 
debate is what to define as “text” and what to define as “context.” This 
question is complicated by recent developments in how parties draft modern 
contracts. For example, gone are the days when courts could simply point to 
a single set of stapled-together papers, signed and dated at the bottom, and 
be certain that this was “the contract.” Rather, courts might reasonably 
determine that the parties’ deal was comprehensively memorialized in a set 
of related agreements, as Hwang describes in a recent article.50 Without being 
able to determine what is and is not part of the deal, it becomes increasingly 
impossible to have a productive discussion about whether to use text or 
context to interpret deal disputes. 
Section C brings in recent literature on contractual complexity and 
shows that modern contracts—beginning with the commercial ones this 
Article examines—are structurally complex. Understanding contractual 
structure and its complexity is necessary to understand what is and is not part 
of the deal. In turn, this enables scholars, courts, and contract designers to 
 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Professors Gilson, Sabel, and Scott do a particularly good job of summing up the two sides’ 
arguments. See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12 (describing the major points of textualist and 
contextualist views of contract interpretation). 
 49 Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1475, 1478 (2010) (noting that New York courts appear to be more textualist in their interpretive 
approach, while California courts appear to take principles of fairness, equality, morality, or public 
policy into account in interpretation); Schwartz & Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 
12, at 928 (noting that “states holding the [textualist] view are led by New York, while California is 
the most significant contextualist jurisdiction”); see also Bionghi v. Metro. Water Dist. of S. Cal., 
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 388, 393 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that in California, as a default, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible when “the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible to the meanings urged by 
the parties,” in light of “any evidence offered to show that the parties’ understanding of words used 
differed from the common understanding”). 
 50 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1410 (describing deals that span a set of contracts and agreements 
as “unbundled bargains”). This Section draws heavily from the discussion in Part III of Hwang’s 
Unbundled Bargains. Id. at 1442–51. 
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have a better grasp of when and how to use text and context in interpreting 
contracts gone awry. 
C. Complexity in Modern Contracting 
In recent years, some scholars have begun to expand on the classic 
rules/standards and text/context research. Building on the logic that the 
decision to use a rule or a standard essentially means trading off between 
front- and back-end costs, Professors Albert Choi and George Triantis have 
argued compellingly that parties might rationally not use a rule, even when 
drafting a provision that is very important to the overall contract. They begin 
by noting that some contract provisions are very important—such as the 
material adverse change clause in an acquisition agreement. The material 
adverse change clause is a heavily negotiated, highly complex provision of 
an acquisition agreement that, if triggered, can scuttle an entire deal.51 In 
other words, if litigated to an adverse judgment, the ex post cost of a material 
adverse change clause is extremely high. Nonetheless, Choi and Triantis 
observe that material adverse change clauses are “remarkably vague.”52 
Drafting vague, but important, contract provisions appears counterintuitive. 
Choi and Triantis then show, however, that the probability of parties litigating 
a material adverse change clause is very low; thus, while the cost of an 
adverse outcome is extremely high, the probability that there will be an 
adverse outcome is very low. This means that parties can rationally choose 
to minimize ex ante drafting costs by choosing to draft the material adverse 
change clause as a standard, because the overall ex post cost of enforcing it 
is quite low.53
 
Choi and Triantis limit their analysis to several individual provisions of 
complex commercial contracts: material adverse change clauses, 
representations and warranties, and a handful of others. Other work, too, has 
focused on individual provisions. In an earlier work, Scott and Triantis 
discuss more broadly how anticipation of later litigation affects how parties 
design contracts ex ante.54 In a more general sense than Choi and Triantis, 
Scott and Triantis identify the trade-off between front-end and back-end 
 
 51 Choi & Triantis, supra note 28, at 865 (noting that “[m]ost large acquisitions include a 
condition that allows the buyer to avoid closing upon the occurrence of a material adverse event or 
change (a MAC)”). 
 52 Id. at 854 (noting that “the typical MAC provision is not quantitative and remains remarkably 
vague”). 
 53 Id. at 896 (noting that “ex post renegotiation relying on a vague MAC condition does create 
some inefficiency”). 
 54 Scott & Triantis, supra note 14, at 836 (noting that their project “examin[es] the important 
but neglected tradeoff between front-end and back-end costs. The resolution of this tradeoff in each 
contracting instance determines the parties’ optimal choice between precise and vague terms”). 
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costs, and how using rules or standards shifts costs between the front and 
back ends.55 
While the rules/standards paradigm is a useful way to think about 
individual contract provisions, and while recent scholarship has added 
meaningful nuance to that study, contracts are more than just individual 
provisions. At the least, most contracts contain many provisions—a fact to 
which others have alluded, but have not explored in detail. Both Scott and 
Triantis and Choi and Triantis, for instance, discuss the coexistence of a 
variety of provisions in the same contract—precise ones and vague ones.56 
But that analysis, too, is limited to thinking about contract provisions—
contracts at the micro level—rather than entire contracts as holistic 
agreements. 
Recent research has shown that contracts, with their many provisions, 
have grown over time, in both length and complexity. In recent work that 
examines twenty years’ worth of data, Professor John Coates shows that 
acquisition agreements have more than doubled in size—from thirty-five 
pages to eighty-eight pages.57 Coates also finds that acquisition agreements 
have become linguistically more complex—increasing approximately ten 
grade levels between 1994 and the 2010s, from approximately grade twenty 
to over grade thirty.58 
In other corporate contexts, documentation has also grown. Consider 
the rise in bulk and complexity of initial public offering prospectuses. The 
purpose of the prospectus—a document that serves as a private company’s 
introduction to the public markets when it is making its initial public offering 
of stock––is to provide new public investors with information about a 
company. Although the offering is technically governed by separate legal 
contracts, the prospectus—a securities disclosure document required by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)59—essentially functions as the 
contractual centerpiece of the deal: it tells investors what is on offer, and 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 Choi & Triantis, supra note 28 (discussing, throughout the paper, how parties use vague and 
precise provisions to advance different expressive and cost-saving goals); see also Scott & Triantis, 
supra note 14 (identifying the trade-off between front-end drafting costs and back-end litigation 
costs). 
 57 Coates, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that “[t]he average M&A contract in 1994 for the relatively 
simple types of M&A transactions in this sample were roughly 17,000 words in length—about 35 
single-spaced pages . . . . By 2014, they had grown to more than 44,000 words per contract, on 
average—about 88 single-spaced pages. This reflects an average compound growth rate . . . of just 
under 5%”). 
 58 Id. (“In linguistic complexity, as measured by the Flesch-Kincaid grade level measure, the 
same contracts increased from an average of ~20 in 1994 to ~30+ in the 2010s.”). 
 59 See 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2012). 
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investors decide whether to buy into the company based on the information 
presented. 
A prospectus, however, is not just a contract between the issuer (who is 
selling the stock) and the investor. Rather, there is a regulator at the table: the 
SEC, which regulates the disclosure, including what it contains and how it 
is presented.60 The involvement of a regulator might suggest that 
prospectuses’ bulk and complexity would grow less over time than the bulk 
and complexity of acquisition agreements, which are privately negotiated 
and which can therefore grow and change quickly and organically. Despite 
being subject to slower moving regulation, however, prospectuses also grow 
quickly. In a recent paper, Professor Jeremy McClane found that between 
2000 and 2015, prospectuses filed for initial public offerings more than 
doubled in size, from approximately 40,000 words to over 100,000 words.61 
McClane also noted that the increasing complexity of prospectuses prompted 
the SEC to promulgate its Plain English Rule in 1998 with the goal of making 
securities disclosures more readable.62 
Recent research also suggests that complexity is not only increasing 
within the boundaries of individual, self-contained contracts. Rather, 
scholars have begun to recognize that complexity has caused commercial 
relationships to burst out of neat contractual seams and into multiple 
agreements and contracts. In more recent work, Choi and Triantis have 
argued that complexity in modern contracts accounts for why parties 
complete commercial deals in stages.63 In many commercial deals—mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A), debt financing, venture financing, and others—
parties first enter into a preliminary agreement that outlines basic deal terms. 
After a time gap, parties follow up with a definitive contract. Choi and 
Triantis note that using this two-step process may help parties deal with the 
cognitive load of parsing many complex issues at once.64 On a practical level, 
contracting in stages also gives parties time to engage subject matter experts 
to weigh in on particularly complex or technical parts of the deal; for 
 
 60 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.430–33 (2011). 
 61 McClane, supra note 18, at 28 (“Between 1996 and 2010, the average size of IPO 
prospectuses rose from just under 40,000 words to just over 100,000.”). 
 62 Id. at 13 (noting that the “‘[P]lain English [R]ule’ . . . mandated that certain parts of the 
prospectus—in particular the summary and risk factors—employ short sentences, concrete language, 
active voice, and avoid jargon and legalese”). 
 63 Choi & Triantis, supra note 2, at 1. 
 64 Id. at 2 (“As Howard Raiffa framed it, there is a tradeoff between maximizing gains from 
trade by allowing log-rolling across a large number of issues, and the cognitive load of dealing with 
all at the same time.”). 
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example, parties may use this time to engage accountants or architects.65 
Hwang has also noted that deal complexity drives M&A parties to design 
deals that span multiple agreements and contracts. In particular, 
modularizing technically complex parts of a deal into separate documents for 
specialist review helps make contracting more efficient and dealmaking 
more streamlined.66 
In a world where contracting is complex, the classic rules/standards 
framework is an inadequate lens through which to understand contract design 
and interpretation. Difficulties arise in determining whether a provision is a 
rule or a standard, and contractual provisions do not always operate 
independent of one another. Recent deals between Pfizer and Wyeth, and 
between Cooper Tire and Apollo, illustrate this complexity and provide 
helpful insight into why evaluating the structure of a contract is necessary to 
understanding contract design, interpretation, and enforcement. 
As a starting point, it is increasingly difficult to sort particular 
provisions into the tidy categories of rules or standards. Consider the material 
adverse change clause in a deal between Pfizer and Wyeth—one of the 
clauses that Choi and Triantis examine in their 2010 paper. In that clause, 
parties used vague terms, including one that allowed Pfizer to terminate the 
agreement if Wyeth had not “performed or complied in all material respects 
with all material agreements and covenants required under this Agreement 
at or prior to the Closing Date.”67 Choi and Triantis use this language to show 
that there is “persistent use of vague language.”68 In that passage, the terms 
“material agreements” and “all material respects,” which are both common 
in acquisition agreements, are vague and open the door to significant 
differences in interpretation over what is considered “material.” But even this 
clause—one of Choi and Triantis’s paradigmatic examples of a vague, 
 
 65 Id. (noting that “[i]n many cases, the deferred issues are turned over to experts, such as 
architects, engineers, accountants, and, in particular, lawyers. While the motivation may be either 
the cognitive load or the need for experts, we will call this second category as being multi-stage 
contracting motivated by complexity”). 
 66 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1418–20 (noting that “[i]n complex M&A deals, specialist input is 
often needed when deals interact with regulation. In practice, firms that advise in these deals often 
employ attorneys who specialize in regulatory areas, and M&A lawyers regularly assign regulatory 
pieces to specialist attorneys . . . . Assigning pieces of a deal to specialists . . . increase[s] dealmaking 
efficiency: . . . Because a specialist lawyer does not need to spend time learning a complex area of 
regulation, the client receives expert advice on a technical issue without needing to pay the M&A 
lawyer to become an expert in that area”). 
 67 Choi & Triantis, supra note 28, at 864 (quoting a portion of the material adverse change clause 
from the Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Pfizer, Inc., Wagner Acquisition Corp., and Wyeth 
(Jan. 25, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
5187/000119312509014288/dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/DBW8-HXB4] [hereinafter Pfizer–Wyeth 
Agreement]). 
 68 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
296 
standard-like provision—has certain rule-like elements. For example, the 
term “Closing Date” is relatively rule-like—the parties define it in section 
1.2 of the agreement as a date before July 31, 2009 at which the closing 
conditions have been met.69 And the Closing Date definition makes reference 
to even more rule-like provisions, such as an exact time of day when closing 
occurs (10 a.m. New York City time).70 In other words, while the material 
adverse change clause in the Pfizer–Wyeth Agreement appears, at first blush, 
to be a vague, standard-like provision, even that categorization is not entirely 
clear or accurate. Rather, in agreements where there are multiple and at least 
partially interdependent provisions, a provision that appears vague may, 
upon further investigation, also have rule-like elements. 
Moreover, analyzing individual provisions—a study of contracts at the 
micro level—is insufficient to understanding the contract as a whole, on a 
macro level. In modern contracts, the core parts of a deal are increasingly 
expressed through multiple interrelated provisions. The Pfizer–Wyeth 
Agreement is a good example. The agreement’s closing conditions—which 
parties must satisfy before the deal can close—require that certain 
representations and warranties true at the time of signing are also true at the 
time of closing. Those representations and warranties require the companies 
to vouch that they have not breached the representations in a way such that it 
causes a material adverse change. The material adverse change clause is 
carefully defined elsewhere and depends upon a series of additional 
subsidiary definitions.71 When contract provisions are interconnected in this 
way, it is no longer sufficient to say that a particular provision—such as a 
material adverse change clause—is a “standard.” Even if it was easy to 
classify a particular provision as a rule or a standard (which it is increasingly 
not), classifying a single provision without reference to interconnected ones 
provides limited, superficial information about what parties aimed to achieve 
through that drafting choice. In other words, as the core parts of the deal are 
increasingly memorialized in multiple related contract provisions, or even 
in multiple related documents, moving beyond a provision-by-provision 
study, and into a macro-level study of contract structure, is increasingly 
important. 
Complications also arise when rules and standards are combined in 
complex agreements, as the recent Cooper Tire litigation in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery illustrates.72 Cooper Tire required the court to interpret a 
buyer’s best efforts obligation in light of other provisions within a merger 
 
 69 Pfizer–Wyeth Agreement, supra note 67, at 1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 76–77. 
 72 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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agreement, including a material adverse effect clause.73 That interplay 
between the relevant provisions of the agreement makes the decision an 
insightful example for our purposes. 
In 2013, two tire companies, Cooper and Apollo, signed an agreement 
under which Apollo would buy Cooper for $2.5 billion.74 The transaction 
went awry when the labor union of one of Cooper’s key Chinese subsidiaries 
went on strike,75 effectively cutting off communications between Cooper and 
its Chinese subsidiary. At the same time, one of Cooper’s U.S. labor unions 
obtained an arbitral order that “prevented Cooper from selling its plants prior 
to a renegotiation of the collective bargaining agreements.”76 Cooper 
negotiated a new agreement with the union, but Apollo refused to consent to 
Cooper’s new union agreement.77 
Cooper needed Apollo to agree to the new union agreement so that the 
parties could close the deal. If the deal was delayed, Cooper would need to 
deliver another round of quarterly financial statements to Apollo, as required 
by the merger agreement—and Cooper could not do so, because its Chinese 
subsidiary was withholding financial information.78 Failure to deliver the 
financial statements would cause Cooper to breach the merger agreement. 
Cooper therefore filed an expedited complaint in the Delaware Court of 
Chancery seeking an injunction requiring Apollo to consent to the 
renegotiated collective bargaining agreement and to consummate the 
merger.79 
That brief recitation of the facts leading up to the dispute already 
suggests the complexity of the contract at issue. It only grows more 
complicated from there. Unlike the classic Frigaliment case, Cooper Tire did 
not turn on the interpretation of a single word. Rather, Cooper Tire 
implicated a thickly interconnected web of contract provisions. Cooper 
argued that one section of the merger agreement obligated Apollo to use its 
reasonable best efforts to enter into a new collective bargaining agreement 
 
 73 See, e.g., Lyons et al., supra note 4. 
 74 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Apollo (Mauritius) Holdings Pvt. Ltd., No. 8980-VCG, 
2014 WL 5654305, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2014); see also David Gelles, Cooper Tire Abandons 
Merger, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2013, 8:07 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/30/cooper-tire-
abandons-merger [https://perma.cc/UU8S-WRU9]. 
 75 Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 2014 WL 5654305, at *5 (discussing Apollo’s contentions that 
the Chairman of the Chinese subsidiary was the true root of the strike and that he threatened to fire 
anyone who did not participate in the strike). 
 76 Id. at *6. 
 77 Id. at *7. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
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in the most expeditious manner possible.80 Apollo countered that a different 
section was the relevant provision, and required only reasonable best efforts 
to “obtain any consents,” and that the collective bargaining agreement was 
not a consent. Apollo further argued that the provision did not require them 
to move in an expeditious manner.81 
Apollo also counterclaimed that Cooper failed to satisfy some of the 
merger agreement’s closing conditions. First, Apollo argued that Cooper had 
failed to operate in the ordinary course of business, which violated a closing 
condition.82 Second, Apollo argued that another condition was unsatisfied: 
the twenty-day marketing period—during which investment banks can 
market the debt by which Apollo would finance the merger—had never 
commenced because Cooper had never provided Apollo with the information 
required for the marketing period to begin.83 Third, Apollo alleged that a 
material adverse effect had occurred, relieving Apollo of its obligations to 
close the transaction.84 As the court noted in its opinion, Apollo essentially 
argued that Cooper’s failure to comply with a single section of the merger 
agreement would have “a cascade effect on other contractual provisions.”85 
In the end, the court ruled that Apollo was not obligated to close the 
transaction.86 
Cooper Tire shows how interconnected provisions in a complex 
contract make it difficult for deal parties to toggle easily between ex ante and 
ex post deal costs, as other scholars have described. The Apollo–Cooper 
agreement contained a number of rule-like provisions. The provision 
requiring a twenty-day marketing period for deal financing and the covenant 
detailing how Cooper would continue operating its business in the ordinary 
course of business are examples of rule-like provisions. The same agreement 
also had a number of standard-like terms. Other scholars have noted that 
“best efforts” and material adverse effect provisions are paradigmatic 
standard-like provisions, and the Apollo–Cooper agreement is riddled with 
them. 
If the Apollo–Cooper agreement had a clean separation between 
provisions, such that each provision only addressed a single hazard, then 
parties could deploy rule-like and standard-like provisions to shift 
 
 80 Id. at *7–8. 
 81 Id. at *7. 
 82 Id. at *14. 
 83 Id. at *10. 
 84 Id. at *11. 
 85 Id. at *13, *19 (explaining that section 5.1(a) imposes the requirement that Cooper shall 
conduct its business in the ordinary course of business and that requirement had a cascade effect on 
the material adverse effect and marketing period provisions). 
 86 Id. at *20. 
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transaction costs. That is, the parties could use a rule-like provision to front-
load contracting costs, or a standard-like provision to defer costs. But the 
Apollo–Cooper agreement lacked such a clean separation between 
provisions. Rather, rule-like terms were linked inextricably with standard-
like terms, and the court had to interpret them collectively. That process of 
collective interpretation, which requires the court to ascertain the structure 
of the deal, is overlooked by existing scholarship. 
 
*          *          * 
 
In summary, current scholarship lacks a framework for understanding 
how parties design complex contract structures. In particular, on a micro, 
single-provision level, the literature does a good job of explaining why 
parties choose to draft provisions the way they do—as rules or standards. But 
on a macro, whole-contract level, there is no similarly coherent explanation 
for how parties put contracts together. There is even less understanding of 
how and why parties piece together rules and standards to form a coherent 
contract or contractual system. Our theory—contractual structuralism—aims 
to shed light on these macro-level issues of contract drafting, and to suggest 
that the structural components of contract drafting are relevant to how 
contracts should be designed and interpreted. 
II. CONTRACTUAL STRUCTURALISM 
For decades, contracts scholars have made important progress 
answering two sets of questions: the ex ante, design-phase, rules/standards 
question, and the ex post, interpretation-phase, text/context question. But 
contract scholars have, thus far, overlooked the increasingly important fact 
that rules and standards are not used in isolation, but rather are combined in 
complex agreements. This raises the critical question: How do rules and 
standards behave when many of them are combined in a single contract or 
deal? 
This Part develops a theory that answers that question. It explains how 
contract provisions interact with one another, and how the deal lawyers 
designing complex agreements use contractual structure to manage those 
interconnections. The collection of multiple rules and standards that parties 
combine into an agreement can be treated as a system—just like the systems 
that are found in other types of modern technology. On that basis, this Article 
uses concepts from design and engineering to study how combinations of 
terms in a contractual system interact with one another, and why it matters 
that they do. 
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The remainder of this Part proceeds as follows. Section A develops the 
theory of contractual structuralism. The theory is deceptively simple, yet 
surprisingly powerful. One way to understand its contribution is as a natural 
extension of the rules and standards scholarship. A central tenet of that 
research is that, when it comes to contract drafting, it is not just what you 
say, but how you say it: whether an idea is expressed as a rule or a standard 
affects how courts interpret and enforce that idea when a dispute arises. 
Contractual structuralism takes that argument one important step further: 
whether parties organize a contractual arrangement as a modular system or 
an integrated system is also important—parties can harness contract 
structure to draft better contracts, and courts can use structure to interpret 
contracts more accurately. Section B presents a few paradigmatic examples 
of modular, integrated, and hybrid structures in action. Deal designers use 
modular design, for example, in complex financial products, modern supply 
chains, securities offerings, and outsourcing relationships. Integrated design 
is also common: “relational contracting,” a combination of formal and 
informal sanctions used in many innovation-driven markets, uses an 
integrated contractual structure. Of course, these paradigmatic models are 
just that: stylized forms used to illustrate concepts. Some transactions may 
use a hybrid of modular and integrated design, and M&A deals are such 
instances. 
A. The Theory of Contractual Structuralism 
The study of complex systems, although fairly new to the law, is in its 
seventh decade. In an early work, Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon argued that 
many natural and social systems are “nearly decomposable” systems87—i.e., 
they are complex systems comprised of subsystems that have “weak, but not 
negligible,” interactions with each other.88 Simon’s conception of the nearly 
decomposable complex system raises the question of what exactly is the 
mechanism that holds subsystems together and makes them work as a 
coherent unit. 
In design and engineering, there are, in essence, two approaches to 
managing the complexity that Professor Simon identified. The first is to 
reduce interdependence and rely on standardized procedures to achieve 
 
 87 Such systems have two characteristics with respect to their evolution over time: first, in the 
short run, the “behavior of each of the component subsystems is approximately independent of 
the . . . behavior of the other components”; and second, in the long run, the “behavior of any one of 
the components depends in only an aggregate way on the behavior of the other components.” 
Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 467, 474 (1962). 
The idea of modularity also arose separately in the architecture literature around this time. 
 88 Id. at 474. 
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coordination. This approach, which is often referred to as modular system 
design, has begun attracting significant attention in legal scholarship.89 Car 
tires, for example, can be considered part of a modular system. There are 
many different types of tires—all-weather tires, snow tires, or high-
performance tires favored by the characters of the Fast and Furious 
franchise, just to name a few. While these tires are different in look and 
function, for the most part they can each be connected to any car through a 
standard connector, or “interface.” Modularity is often attractive because it 
can reduce the costs of change within a complex system. If modules are 
cleanly separated from other parts of the system, system designers can make 
adjustments within a module without disturbing the rest of the system. A car 
tire, for example, can be patched or inflated without affecting the rest of the 
car. Modularity also means that designers can swap entire modules in and 
out, using the standard interface. The main cost of designing a modular 
system is ensuring that the interface between modules works well. 
The second approach is integrated design, which maintains thick 
connections between different parts of the system. Of course, that thick 
integration is the very problem that modularity is designed to solve, so there 
must be an alternative approach. Integrated subsystems are only feasible if 
there are opportunities for extensive communication among the personnel 
managing the different subsystems, so that they can swiftly translate changes 
to one subsystem across the others.90 A cookie recipe, for example, is 
integrated—ingredients depend on each other to taste right, and even the 
sequence by which they are introduced can matter. And, once mixed, the 
recipe cannot easily be undone without considerable skill—failing to 
properly chill the butter to be used in a cookie recipe, for example, will 
require careful adjustments to other parts of the recipe to achieve the desired 
outcome. Integrated design does not require investment in a standard 
interface. It does, however, require investment in the people who run the 
integrated system, who must understand not only their parts of the system, 
but also how changes to their parts will affect the rest of the system. This 
Part refers to the routines established to foster such communication as 
“flexible specialization,” a term coined by Professors Michael Piore and 
Charles Sabel, and which has remained largely unexplored in the literature 
on contract design.91 
 
 89 In particular, Henry Smith’s pioneering research in the field of property is often credited with 
bringing modularity theory to the law. Smith, supra note 22. 
 90 See generally Kannan Srikanth & Phanish Puranam, Integrating Distributed Work: 
Comparing Task Design, Communication, and Tacit Coordination Mechanisms, 32 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. J. 849 (2011). 
 91 See JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL J. PIORE 
& CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 28–35 (1984). 
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In summary, modular design and integrated design sit on opposite ends 
of a continuum. A particular contract’s structure can exist at one end or the 
other, or be situated somewhere along that continuum. 
1. Modular System Design 
One way to think of modular design is as a “divide and conquer” 
approach to managing a complex system. As a system becomes larger and 
increasingly complicated, altering one subsystem can lead to a cascade of 
changes across all of the other subsystems.92 One solution is to “modularize” 
the structure of the system.93 This strategy has three steps. First, the system 
is subdivided into many separate, self-contained modules. Second, 
somewhat counterintuitively, the system “hides” particular types of 
information within each module, so that other modules do not have direct 
access to that information. Finally, the system connects the modules back 
together into a larger system using a standard interface.94 
Consider a classic example of modularity: the Lego system of 
interlocking blocks. Lego uses a standardized interface—the same type of 
“studs” on every block—to allow a dizzying array of plastic blocks to be 
connected to one another. All blocks, regardless of their type, can be 
connected and disconnected from one another, which allows them to be 
recombined in an equally large variety of arrangements. Modularity can also 
play a role as the complexity of a Lego system increases. For instance, 
complicated building sets, which in some cases can include over four 
 
 92 Mid-twentieth century software programming provides what has become a canonical 
example. As software programs increased in size, the number of engineers included on the design 
team would grow in turn. This made the traditional method of ensuring interoperability between the 
code each engineer created—which involved, at the start of the day, each member of the team 
reviewing the code the other members produced the day before—unwieldy: the amount of code 
being produced led to the engineers spending a large amount of time every day digesting the entire 
team’s output. Unless an organizational solution was devised, eventually the complexity of the 
software system would completely overwhelm the team’s resources. See CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM 
B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY 149–68 (2000). 
 93 Modularity is the subject of a now vast interdisciplinary literature spanning the social and 
natural sciences. For overviews of the former, see id. For overviews of modularity in the natural 
sciences, see Werner Callebaut, The Ubiquity of Modularity, in MODULARITY: UNDERSTANDING 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATURAL COMPLEX SYSTEMS 3 (Werner Callebaut & Diego Rasskin-
Gutman eds., 2005). Both Professors Simon and Alexander struck upon the basic idea in their 
independent explorations of complex systems. See CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, NOTES ON THE 
SYNTHESIS OF FORM (1964); Simon, supra note 87. Pivotal contributions since then include Eric von 
Hippel, Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable, 19 RES. POL’Y 407 (1990); Ron Sanchez 
& Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in Product and 
Organizational Design, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63 (1996); and BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 92. 
 94 BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 92, at 63–64. Professors Baldwin and Clark define an 
“interface” as a “preestablished way to resolve potential conflicts between interacting parts of a 
design. It is like a treaty between two or more subelements.” Id. at 73. 
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thousand individual pieces,95 are often built in modules, which are then 
combined. 
In complex, real-world engineering projects, the logic works the same 
way: modularity allows designers to break up complex systems into smaller 
chunks and join the systems together later. Because the modules are 
separated from each other, designers can change a single module without 
disturbing the rest of the system. Moreover, so long as all of the individual 
modules feed into a common interface, modularity also means that work can 
proceed on each module concurrently.96 
All of these attributes mean that modularity can successfully manage 
complexity that may otherwise overwhelm a system.97 Examples of 
modularity strategies solving complexity problems include a variety of areas, 
from software to electronics to flat-packed furniture.98 Subsequent research 
has extended modularity to organizational design99 and to the structure of 
property law.100 
 
 95 10188 Death Star, BRICKIPEDIA, http://lego.wikia.com/wiki/10188_Death_Star [https:// 
perma.cc/6U8X-CT6Y] (describing Lego’s Death Star model, released in 2008, which consists of 
approximately 3800 Lego pieces); 75159 The Death Star, BRICKIPEDIA, http://lego.wikia.com/ 
wiki/75159_The_Death_Star [https://perma.cc/YJ3D-2LR3] (describing Lego’s new Death Star 
model, released in 2016, which consists of 4016 Lego pieces). 
 96 BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 92, at 89–91. 
 97 Id. at 90–91. 
 98 A well-known example of modular product architecture is second-generation computer 
technology, such as IBM’s System/360 family, which was developed in the 1960s. See id. at 194 
(discussing the development of IBM’s System/360 computers). The preceding computer systems 
IBM developed in the 1950s had precise instructions for executing desired calculations hard-wired 
into the computers’ control units, leading to a high degree of interdependence between subsystems. 
That interdependence led to entirely different systems being designed for particular market niches. 
Customer complaints mounted, as they struggled with the lack of compatibility between the various 
computers offered. IBM responded with an innovation that, at the time, was unprecedented: 
requiring all of its next generation of computer processors to use the same set of instructions in a 
common control system. That standard interface allowed the development of the separate processors 
in the System/360 family to proceed in parallel, and resulted in a suite of different yet interoperable 
computers. As Baldwin and Clark note, modularity was a challenge to achieve because, while IBM 
successfully modulated hardware design, operating system software remained highly integrated. Id. 
at 169–94. For more detail on IBM’s design process for System/360, see FREDRICK P. BROOKS, JR., 
THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (1975). 
 99 See generally Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 19 (2002) (applying modularity to the theory of the firm); Sanchez & Mahoney, 
supra note 93 (same); Timothy J. Sturgeon, Modular Production Networks: A New American Model 
of Industrial Organization, 11 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2002) (applying modularity to the 
structure of production networks). 
 100 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus 
Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002). 
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Section B below discusses examples of modular design in contract law. 
It is worth noting here that this Article’s contribution is not merely to 
describe modularity in contract law but to develop a holistic theory for 
understanding contractual structure. Modularity—which is on one extreme 
of the contract structure continuum—is one way to structure contracts, and 
just one piece of the theory of contractual structure. 
In fact, prior research has already made some headway in identifying 
aspects of modularity in contract design. Professor Smith’s extension of 
modularity theory from property law to the design of boilerplate provisions 
is the earliest articulation of the theory.101 In a 2012 paper, Triantis built upon 
Smith’s work, arguing that complex agreements exhibit a modular structure 
that document assembly software can exploit.102 Machine learning can start 
with modules, and then tailor contracts by “adding, adjusting, swapping, and 
removing modules” according to clients’ needs.103 That argument echoed the 
2011 empirical analysis of Professors Blair et al., who found evidence of 
modular design in outsourcing agreements.104 Hwang’s recent analysis of the 
structure of M&A deals provides additional support, suggesting that one of 
the benefits of modular contracting is that it allows specialists to work on 
separate, technical sections of the contract.105 
Segmenting a complex system to allow for greater specialization within 
each module is another way that modularity can make system creation more 
efficient—but specialization also sows the seeds of modularity’s limits. 
Modularity only works where there is a stable standardized connector. 
Moreover, once a system has committed to a particular connector, the costs 
of changing that interface increase as the size of the system increases.106 That 
is, although modularity lowers the cost of changing within individual 
modules, changing the system’s architecture may be costly.107 
 
 101 See Radin, supra note 22; Smith, supra note 22. 
 102 Triantis, supra note 22. 
 103 Id. at 191. 
 104 Margaret M. Blair, Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Gregg Kirchhoefer, Outsourcing, Modularity, 
and the Theory of the Firm, 2011 BYU L. REV. 263. 
 105 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1418–20 (describing the process by which M&A lawyers put 
complex, technical areas of the contract into “complex modules” so that specialist attorneys, such as 
employment attorneys or intellectual property attorneys, can work on those sections). 
 106 BALDWIN & CLARK, supra note 92, at 205. 
 107 Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-
Firm Collaboration in the New Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 388, 398–99 (2004). Tellingly, 
Baldwin and Clark’s description of IBM’s modular System/360 design includes a recitation of the 
costly multi-year undertaking that was required to design the system’s architecture. BALDWIN & 
CLARK, supra note 92. 
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Imagine, for instance, if Lego changed the sizes of their blocks’ classic 
studs, which have been the same size since 1958.108 A person who currently 
has a small Lego collection may not be bothered by the change. However, a 
person with a large Lego collection—who intends to continue buying Legos 
and mixing new pieces with old—might find the stud change enormously 
expensive and detrimental to their continued enjoyment of their Legos. 
Because changing a modular system’s interface is so expensive, 
modular systems are particularly susceptible to path dependency. A poorly 
designed modular system might very well stay that way, simply because it 
costs too much to fix the dysfunctional product architecture.109 Modularity 
therefore presents a trade-off. On one hand, it is easier and cheaper to make 
incremental, intramodular changes within a modular system. On the other 
hand, broader, structural changes are challenging and expensive.110 
2. Integrated System Design 
Another way to design a complex system is to make it integrated.111 
Integration can be understood as the opposite of modularity—an integrated 
system has direct connections between the various constituent units.112 Most 
often, separate components are purpose-built to work together, and a change 
in one part causes changes in another. 
As one might suspect, when components are highly interconnected, the 
cascading effect of change can be hard to manage. To address that issue, 
integrated systems often rely upon a rich reservoir of system-specific 
information. Often, this is an individual or a team who understands the 
 
 108 The LEGO Group History, LEGO (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.lego.com/en-us/aboutus/ 
lego-group/the_lego_history [https://perma.cc/VV23-WFKK]. 
 109 Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 107. 
 110 See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 91, at 47–48. 
 111 This strategy has long been recognized in business literature, but is overlooked in legal 
scholarship. See MARCH & SIMON, supra note 91; J. Douglas Orton & Karl E. Weick, Loosely 
Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 203 (1990); Srikanth & Puranam, 
supra note 90. Professor Sabel provides perhaps the richest theory of this collaborative form of 
production. That theory was originally outlined in PIORE & SABEL, supra note 91. It was further 
developed in Charles F. Sabel, Learning by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, 
in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994); 
WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES: FLEXIBILITY AND MASS PRODUCTION IN WESTERN INDUSTRIALIZATION 
(Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1997); Susan Helper, John Paul MacDuffie & Charles Sabel, 
Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism, 9 INDUS. & CORP. 
CHANGE 443 (2000); and Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 107. Organizational routines have also been 
identified as a source of competitive advantage and have become the subject of a vast literature in 
corporate strategy. See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 
OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); David J. Teece, Gary Pisano & Amy Shuen, Dynamic Capabilities 
and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997); Sidney G. Winter, The Satisficing 
Principle in Capability Learning, 10 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 981 (2000). 
 112 See Srikanth & Puranam, supra note 90, at 850. 
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system’s nooks and crannies, and who can rapidly shepherd and troubleshoot 
a change as it makes its way through the entire system.113 Routines for 
sharing information and expertise among members of the team are often 
crucial for success.114 With the costs of customization reduced, what is called 
“flexible specialization”—where designers can build specific expertise but 
also remain flexible as they are required to efficiently reconfigure assets—is 
possible.115 
Examples of flexible specialization are found historically and in 
contemporary economic organization. Classic examples include nineteenth-
century industrial districts, such as in Western Europe and the eastern United 
States, which produced a wide array of customized products using expert 
craftspeople and universal machinery.116 A paradigmatic contemporary 
example is Apple’s approach to the design of its electronics products. The 
iPhone, iPad, MacBook, and Mac desktop are integrated systems, where 
functions are thickly interconnected and discrete modular boundaries are 
 
 113 Those routines are substantively simple in that they establish processes for identifying, 
investigating, and addressing dysfunction within a complex system, and those processes combine 
into an elegant framework for continuous improvement. As engineers trace errors to their root causes 
across the system and interact with other teams, the relentless search for improvement transforms 
otherwise tacit knowledge of the system’s inner working into explicit information that is more easily 




 115 “Flexible specialization” is Professors Piore and Sabel’s original term for the phenomenon. 
PIORE & SABEL, supra note 91. 
 116 The concept of an industrial district finds its origins in Professor Marshall’s work, well over 
100 years ago. ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 332–38 (8th ed. 1890). For more recent 
scholarship on the topic, see, for example, PIORE & SABEL, supra note 91; JOSH WHITFORD, THE NEW 
OLD ECONOMY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MANUFACTURING 2–4 (2005) [hereinafter WHITFORD, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY]; Håkon 
With Andersen, Producing Producers: Shippers, Shipyards and the Cooperative Infrastructure of 
the Norwegian Maritime Complex Since 1850, in WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES, supra note 111, at 461; 
Rudolf Boch, The Rise and Decline of Flexible Production: The Cutlery Industry in Solingen Since 
the Eighteenth Century, in WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES, supra note 111, at 153; Bennett Harrison, 
Industrial Districts: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 26 REGIONAL STUD. 469 (1992); Carlo Poni, Fashion 
as Flexible Production: The Strategies of the Lyons Silk Merchants in the Eighteenth Century, in 
WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES, supra note 111, at 37 (Patrick Leech trans.); Charles F. Sabel, Flexible 
Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies, in REVERSING INDUSTRIAL DECLINE? 
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE AND POLICY IN BRITAIN AND HER COMPETITORS 17 (Paul Hirst & 
Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 1989); Béatrice Veyrassat, Manufacturing Flexibility in Nineteenth-Century 
Switzerland: Social and Institutional Foundations of Decline and Revival in Calico-Printing and 
Watchmaking, in WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES, supra note 111, at 188; Josh Whitford, The Decline of a 
Model? Challenge and Response in the Italian Industrial Districts, 30 ECON. & SOC’Y 38, 38–39 
(2001); and Josh Whitford & Jonathan Zeitlin, Governing Decentralized Production: Institutions, 
Public Policy, and the Prospects for Inter-Firm Cooperation in US Manufacturing, 11 INDUSTRY & 
INNOVATION 11, 12 (2004). 
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rarely established.117 This results in devices offering a material, although not 
inexhaustible, amount of customization, while also achieving a highly 
intuitive level of operation. Apple famously uses a vertically integrated 
design and production process to develop those products—a strategy that 
helps foster the expertise and organizational routines necessary for flexible 
specialization to thrive.118 
Of course, flexible specialization comes with its own costs. It may not 
rely upon a standardized interface that is susceptible to path dependency, but 
flexible specialization does require a significant investment in human capital. 
That investment typically requires a strong coordinating institution, such as 
a dominant company or a trade association capable of subsidizing the regular 
outlays.119 The historical record of withered industrial districts attests to the 
difficulty of maintaining those coordinating institutions, which are 
inherently prone to collective action problems.120 
B. Contractual Structuralism in Complex Contracting 
Interestingly, evidence shows that neither modular nor integrated 
design is a dominant model in the modern economy, and evidence of markets 
using both types abounds. This Section provides examples illustrating 
modular design, integrated design, and hybrid modular-integrated design. 
The breadth of the examples—from financial derivatives to manufacturing 
supply chains, from research and development collaborations to M&A 
agreements—are suggestive of contractual structuralism’s sweep. 
1. Modular Design: Derivatives, Debt, and Harley-Davidson’s 
Supply Chain 
Modularized contracts appear in a wide variety of contexts, including 
the derivatives market, long-term supply relationships, and the disclosures 
filed with the SEC in preparation for a securities offering. The modular 
nature of the contract can streamline the deal-making process and ensure a 
stable set of foundational expectations. 
One of the most dramatic examples of a modular contract system is 
found in the market for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives—a rather exotic 
species of contract that banks and companies use to hedge against a variety 
 
 117 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION 145 n.15 
(2003) (discussing Apple’s integrated products as a key element of its successful strategy for market 
disruption). 
 118 Vertical Integration Works for Apple—But It Won’t for Everyone, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON 
(Mar. 14, 2012), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/vertical-integration-works-for-apple-but-it-
wont-for-everyone [https://perma.cc/UBM7-VN72]. 
 119 PIORE & SABEL, supra note 91, at 265. 
 
120
 Id. at 286–95. 
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of financial risks.121 For example, an interest rate swap is a contract by which 
the parties exchange one stream of interest payments, usually at a fixed rate, 
for another, usually at a variable rate.122 Transactions in that market rely upon 
a standard master agreement designed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA).123 The highly standardized Master 
Agreement acts as the interface for a variety of subsidiary agreements, which 
are modules. Through those subsidiary agreement modules, parties can and 
do customize their deal.124 
Subsidiary agreement modules in the OTC context come in two 
varieties. Some modules allow the parties to tailor the contract to the 
specifics of their relationship by opting into predetermined terms. This is 
similar to selecting different packages of features when buying a car. For 
instance, a Schedule, which is an ancillary document that is attached to a 
contract, typically follows the ISDA Master Agreement. The Schedule 
outlines a few preset packages of terms. Parties can choose from those preset 
packages in the Schedule to modify the ISDA Master Agreement, by 
changing the governing law, for example.125 In addition to the Schedule, 
parties may also adopt one of ISDA’s other standard add-on agreements to 
amend or supplement the ISDA Master Agreement.126 
These modules allow parties to tailor the ISDA Master Agreement on 
the margins without extensive bilateral negotiation costs and with the added 
benefit of complying with standard industry expectations.127 In each of those 
 
 121 Interest Rate Swaps, PAC. INV. MGMT. CO. (2016), https://global.pimco.com/en-
gbl/resources/education/understanding-interest-rate-swaps [https://perma.cc/BXC2-NKB8]. 
 122 Id. 
 123 GuyLaine Charles, The ISDA Master Agreement—Part I: Architecture, Risks and Compliance, 
PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE & RISK MANAGEMENT FOR THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY, 2012, at 25–26. The 
ISDA Master Agreement was originally published in 1987 and subsequently revised in 1992 and 
2002. Both the 1992 and 2002 versions of the Master Agreement are regularly used in the market. 
Id. at 26. 
 124 Anna Gelpern, The Importance of Being Standard, in EUROPEAN CENT. BANK 2016 ANN. LEGAL 
DEP’T CONF. PROC. 23, 40 (2017), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ 
escblegalconference2016_201702.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NRD-CDL7] (“[T]he parties are free to 
customize, so long as they do so in designated places—schedules and confirmations—which makes 
departures from the standard easier to spot and analyse . . . .”). 
 125 Charles, supra note 123, at 26. 
 126 ISDA has a number of “tailoring” modules that are common. For example, parties may use 
a Credit Support Annex to provide and receive collateral. ISDA has also developed a number of 
Definitional Booklets containing terms standard to specific types of transactions, and a number of 
standardized confirmations for various transaction types. Id. at 27. 
 127 See Protocols Overview, INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N (2018), 
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/about-isda-protocols 
[https://perma.cc/7VVT-2WE7]; Gelpern, supra note 124, at 40. 
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instances, the ISDA Master Agreement serves as the central interface, and 
parties can swap standardized terms in and out by adding modules. 
A second form of modularity in the OTC context allows the parties to 
tailor the terms of specific transactions within their broader trading 
relationship. In this form of modularity, the ISDA Master Agreement is still 
the central hub of activity—but it is a hub that simply sets the ground rules 
of the relationship. The specifics of the relationship—such as price, notional 
amount, underlying asset, and payment dates of the derivatives being 
traded—are agreed to in a module: a “confirmation.”128 Separating those 
economic terms from the Master Agreement allows parties to adjust their 
exchanges in response to day-to-day market fluctuations without 
renegotiating all of the ground rules governing their relationship. 
Modular contract systems are also common outside of the OTC 
derivatives market.129 In many commercial relationships, the OTC market’s 
hub-and-spoke structure is very common. 
Harley-Davidson’s arrangement with its suppliers is paradigmatic of 
many manufacturing relationships. Harley uses a standardized set of general 
terms and conditions, which apply to all purchases by Harley.130 Those 
general terms and conditions specify core aspects of the exchange 
relationship, including offer and acceptance, inspections, pricing, warranties, 
and termination.131 The general terms and conditions, however, are not the 
complete agreement between the parties. Instead, both parties plan to 
periodically enter into purchase orders that specify economic and delivery 
terms, such as delivery, performance, and price terms for each shipment.132 
In that respect, the general terms and conditions act as a standardized 
interface, and purchase order modules adjust the exchange relationship 
periodically. 
 
 128 Gelpern, supra note 124, at 27. 
 129 There are additional examples to those discussed in the text. For instance, information 
technology outsourcing transactions also follow modular design principles, particularly if they are 
dealing with routine items. STUART D. LEVI, OUTSOURCING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW AND 
BUSINESS 5–9 (2011). Typically, a party outsourcing certain functions to a vendor will negotiate a 
master outsourcing agreement, which acts as a standard interface similar to the ISDA Master 
Agreement, a shelf registration statement, or the Harley Terms and Conditions explored here. 
Pursuant to that master agreement, the parties will then execute separate “Statements of Work” for 
specific deliverables over the course of the relationship. Id. Statements of Work act like the 
Confirmations in the OTC derivatives market or purchase orders in the Harley example—they give 
the parties an opportunity to customize the terms of a specific transaction without renegotiating all 
of the terms governing the relationship. Id. 
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The securities offering context provides another ripe example. In 
general, when a company issues debt or equity, it must file detailed 
disclosures with the Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing 
information about the company itself, and about the security being offered.133 
Because the disclosure process is both complex and technical, the process of 
preparing a disclosure can delay an offering by weeks or months. 
Certain seasoned issuers, however, can speed up the process by 
modularizing their filings. In particular, seasoned issuers can file a shelf 
registration statement well before they plan to issue securities.134 A shelf 
registration statement serves as the system’s hub—in it, the issuer discloses 
information that it expects to file in any future securities offerings. For 
example, in almost any securities offering filing, an issuer with substantial 
international businesses might disclose that its business is subject to 
exchange rate risk.135 
After the issuer has created a shelf registration statement, the issuer can 
file abbreviated disclosures for future securities offerings. In future securities 
offerings, the issuer can simply refer to and incorporate information from the 
shelf registration statement, without repeating that information. For example, 
in future filings, the issuer simply refers readers back to the shelf 
registration’s disclosures about exchange rate risk. By putting a substantial 
amount of generic information into a standardized shelf registration 
statement, an issuer can substantially abbreviate the disclosure process for 
securities filed after the shelf registration.136 
 
 133 Joseph K. Leahy, What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-envisioning Underwriters’ Continuous 
Due Diligence After Worldcom, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2001, 2014–16 (2009) (describing the 
deregulation that led to the creation of the shelf registration process, and how the shelf registration 
process works). 
 134 Id. at 2015–16 (describing the process by which seasoned issuers can shorten filing times 
“by filing the basic offering documents in advance”). 
 135 Coca-Cola’s 2015 shelf registration statement is a particularly interesting example of 
modularity in securities offerings. Coca-Cola’s shelf registration statement on Form S-3 notes only 
very basic information—for example, that the Form S-3 is a shelf registration statement, and that it 
may use information from the form in conjunction with future offerings of debt or equity. Instead of 
disclosing risk factors and other information, however, Coca-Cola’s shelf registration statement 
simply refers readers back to its recent annual and periodic disclosures. See Coca Cola Co., 
Registration Statement (Form S-3) (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 
21344/000104746916016337/a2230045zs-3asr.htm#bg10501_table_of_contents [https://perma.cc/ 
9YHD-2M3E]. 
 136 Leahy, supra note 133, at 2015–16 (describing how information is separated between a shelf 
registration statement and later “shelf takedown” offering). 
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2. Integrated Design: Innovation Networks and Original  
Equipment Manufacturing 
Integrated design is on the opposite end of the spectrum from modular 
design. While modular systems have self-contained parts with weak 
connections between them, integrated systems have deeply interconnected 
subsystems. Relational contracting, which appears in many contexts, is a 
paradigmatic example of integrated contract design.137 Relational contracts 
blend formal contract terms, which are enforceable in court, with informal 
constraints, such as reputational sanctions, to create strong relationships 
between parties. A prenuptial agreement, for example, blends formal terms 
(the prenuptial contract) with informal constraints (the informal norms 
partners develop when living together) to form a relationship that blends 
formal and informal elements. Informal constraints operate as an 
unquantifiable overlay to formal contracts, and are, by nature, difficult to 
cabin into discrete modules.138 
In 1963, Professor Stewart Macauley observed that parties do not 
always govern their relationships by litigating disputes in court.139 Rather, 
they govern their relationships to a significant extent through informal 
means: for example, through the threat of refusing to deal with an 
opportunistic party in the future, or the threat of harming the party’s 
reputation in the industry.140 Macauley’s work served as the foundation from 
which the theory of relational contracting grew. In later work, other scholars 
found that many relationships that appear contractual actually rely on a 
 
 137 The number of industries studied is vast with representative studies including AVNER GREIF, 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM MEDIEVAL TRADE (2006) 
(studying medieval Jewish trading networks); JANET TAI LANDA, ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF CHINESE 
MERCHANTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: IDENTITY, ETHNIC COOPERATION AND CONFLICT (2016) (analyzing 
Chinese merchant networks in southeast Asia); BARAK D. RICHMAN, STATELESS COMMERCE: THE 
DIAMOND NETWORK AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RELATIONAL EXCHANGE (2017) (analyzing wholesale 
diamond merchants); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 116 (1992) (studying wholesale 
diamond merchants); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001) 
(analyzing the cotton industry); and Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous 
Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 350 (1981) 
(analyzing Chinese merchant networks in southeast Asia). 
 138 See Jennejohn, supra note 19. 
 139 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. 
SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963) (noting that businesspeople often do not use legal means to settle disputes). 
 
140
 Id. at 61–62. 
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broader social context to inform and enforce the parties’ contractual 
performance obligations.141 
Consider employment relationships. Although employment is a 
contractual relationship, law student Jane might relinquish other job offers 
once she has orally agreed to work for a particular law firm. The firm, too, 
might turn down other applicants once Jane orally accepts the job—even 
though the firm and Jane have not yet signed an employment contract. In 
those cases, Jane and the law firm are relying on promises that are not yet 
enforceable. Why would they do that? Although employment relationships 
are typically contracts, the strength of the relationship between the firm and 
Jane relies on social context. If the firm reneges on its offer, Jane might tell 
her classmates or her school’s career office, thereby harming the firm’s 
reputation. If Jane reneges, the firm can do the same. And, of course, the 
reason that the parties feel comfortable taking the actions that they do—Jane 
turning down other offers, and the firm turning down other candidates—is 
that they are operating within a social context where these kinds of informal 
but binding arrangements are common. 
From the perspective of relational contracting, formal contract law is 
not the only way to create relationship infrastructure. Rather, social norms 
that define informal sanctions, such as a refusal to deal or a reputational hit, 
also play an important role in creating infrastructure.142 
Superficially, the interactions between formal and informal contracts 
appear quite simple. Early research took the position that formal and 
informal agreements were substitutes for one another.143 That research 
argued that contracts can become self-enforcing by virtue of informal 
constraints—in other words, simply writing down a contract, even if there is 
no threat of enforcement by a third party, makes parties perform the 
contract.144 A natural extension, then, was that creating a formal contract may 
crowd out those efficient social norms. That is, entering into formal 
agreements may signal distrust of one’s partner—and an informal, trust-
 
 141 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 865–80 (1978); Ian 
R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 484. 
 142 For useful overviews of how informal governance operates and its role in modern and pre-modern 
economies, see generally CUSTOMARY LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lisa Bernstein & Francesco Parisi, eds., 
2014), and ERIC A. POSNER, LAW & SOCIAL NORMS (2002). 
 143 See, e.g., Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (2000); 
Rachel E. Kranton & Anand V. Swamy, The Hazards of Piecemeal Reform: British Civil Courts and 
the Credit Market in Colonial India, 58 J. DEV. ECON. 1, 1 (1999); Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, 
The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 
1518 (2006). 
 144 See Trebilcock & Leng, supra note 143, at 1539. 
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based relationship may actually be the best way to ensure performance at low 
cost.145 
Formal enforcement may also interfere with (better) informal 
governance because some interpretive frameworks insist on considering 
context, but do a poor job of understanding it. The Uniform Commercial 
Code and Restatement (Second) of Contracts are prime examples. Both have 
adopted contextualist views, and encourage courts to consider extrinsic 
evidence, such as trade usage, course of dealing, and course of 
performance.146 At the same time, both are prone to misread informal 
commercial practice.147 As a result, some courts are poor context 
interpreters—but do it anyway. This result has led some commentators to 
argue that textualism is more appropriate for resolving disputes arising from 
relational contracts—it at least stays out of trying to interpret informal 
practices that it does not understand.148 
When formal and informal contracts substitute for one another, they are 
implicitly modular. That is, they act like two branches of a flow chart: each 
is a valid way to proceed, but they cannot exist at the same time, and they 
cannot interact well together. Critiques of the Uniform Commercial Code’s 
 
 145 Jeffrey H. Dyer & Harbir Singh, The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of 
Interorganizational Competitive Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 660, 671 (1998); Ranjay Gulati, 
Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in 
Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 105–07 (1995). 
 146 See U.C.C. § 1-303 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 221–23 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 147 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1783–87 (1996). 
 148 Schwartz & Scott, Limits of Contract Law, supra note 12. Professor Benjamin Klein notes, 
however, that self-enforcement does not necessarily mean that formal contract terms are irrelevant. 
Klein argues that transacting parties use formal contracts in tandem with informal constraints to 
police hold-up problems. According to Klein, transacting parties write their formal contracts to 
address only hold-up problems of such magnitude that they fall outside of a “self-enforcing range” 
policed via informal constraints. The parties’ respective amounts of social capital determine that 
“self-enforcement range” in an exchange. Formal contract terms then expressly set the bounds of 
that range, and they are used sparingly because formal obligations, which are unavoidably 
incomplete, present opportunities themselves for hold-up—i.e., via litigation of ambiguous terms. 
Informal enforcement is understood to not present such opportunities for holdup through litigation, 
and so, if social norms are sufficiently potent, Klein presumes that parties will opt for informal 
governance instead of formal. In that respect, formal and informal contracts are used in tandem, but 
they are ultimately substitutes for one another—one does not deploy formal governance where 
informal will suffice. Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of 
Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 455–60 (1996). Empirical studies have found 
evidence of parties eschewing formal agreements in favor of informal governance, providing support 
for the substitutionary thesis. See David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in 
Biotech Strategic Alliances, 50 J.L. & ECON. 559, 561 (2007); David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, 
Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 242, 270 (2006). 
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and Second Restatement’s brand of contextualism149 can then be understood 
as an effort to maintain separation between the two distinct modules of 
formality and informality. If there is a problem in the binary system of 
contract enforcement, it is that the boundary between the two modules is not 
rigorously enough policed, and muddling the two creates odd results. 
In recent years, researchers have moved away from this superficial 
understanding of the relationship between formal and informal contracts and 
have begun articulating an alternative theory: that formal and informal 
contracts are complements to, rather than substitutes for, one another.150 
Although theories of complementarity in relational contracting differ in their 
particulars, they all argue that formal agreements play a role in fostering the 
information exchanges upon which informal governance relies.151 The 
starting point for these theories is a high uncertainty exchange environment, 
such as research and development collaborations in technology.152 In those 
markets, it is difficult for parties to foresee future events and set their 
performance obligations accordingly.153 It is also often difficult, however, for 
parties to rely upon stable social norms in these dynamic and heterogeneous 
 
 149 See Bernstein, supra note 147; Schwartz & Scott, Limits of Contract Law, supra note 12. 
 150 This argument has its roots in early work by Professors Goetz and Scott, who envision certain 
key formal contract terms, such as best efforts provisions, as being tools for relational contracting. 
See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 
1089 (1981). It is also founded on theoretical work by Professors Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 
which demonstrates that, in certain situations, an optimal incentive contract includes (1) an objective 
performance measure (which is necessarily imperfect), and (2) an informal understanding regarding 
how that objective performance measure is rewarded, which serves to moderate the distortions 
arising from the imperfections in the formal agreement. See generally George Baker, Robert Gibbons 
& Kevin J. Murphy, Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts, 109 Q.J. 
ECON. 1125 (1994). Subsequent empirical studies have found preliminary evidence supporting the 
complementarity thesis. See generally Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and 
Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707 
(2002). 
 151 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 562 (2015) (discussing how 
midwestern original equipment manufacturers use a combination of formal contracts, intra-firm 
hierarchy, and relational contracting to create long-term relationships); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. 
Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory, 
Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377 (2010) [hereinafter Gilson, Sabel & Scott, 
Braiding]; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12; Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: 
Using Formal Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 
981, 981 (describing the process by which companies used formal contracts, combined with 
relational tools, to motivate performance with external contracting parties); Jennejohn, supra note 
19. 
 152 See generally, e.g., Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 151; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 
12; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 151; Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, 
Innovation, and Contract Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83 (2008). 
 153 See Jennejohn, supra note 152. 
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markets.154 Instead of choosing formal or informal contracts exclusively, then, 
parties design ingenious formal contracts that essentially artificially 
manufacture the conditions for informal governance to work. Professors 
Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott’s theory of contractual 
braiding is one leading theory.155 In high-uncertainty environments, parties 
sometimes do not make investments in their relationship together, for fear 
that the other party will not do the same. Informal contracts usually help 
motivate parties to make investments. Braiding theory argues that 
specialized contract terms can help do some of the work usually done 
through informal contracts by requiring parties to invest in relationship-
specific information.156 Specialized terms also create a “referee” mechanism 
that ensures both parties make symmetric investments in information over 
the course of the relationship.157 As a consequence, thick and inseparable 
connections—the “braid,” to use Gilson et al.’s metaphor—between formal 
and informal contracts arise.158 
Professor Lisa Bernstein’s recent study of supply chains contracts is an 
example of the integrated nature of relational contracts. Using original data 
collected by Professor Josh Whitford for his impressive analysis of 
collaborative production relationships in the industrial Midwest,159 Bernstein 
carefully traces how original equipment manufacturers use formal and 
informal contracts with their suppliers.160 The parties use a rich collection of 
formal agreements, including master agreements and purchase orders, for 
 
 154 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 12; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 151. But 
see Bernstein, supra note 151 (presenting a different interpretation of the governance mechanisms 
at work in the case studies Gilson, Sabel, and Scott discuss). 
 155 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 151, at 1377 (setting forth the theory of braiding, 
in which contracts “intertwine formal and informal mechanisms” to allow both to respond 
cooperatively). 
 156 Id. at 1388. 
 157 Id. at 1403; see also Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 151, at 988 (arguing that formal 
contracts provide the “scaffolding” for informal governance by defining breach in situations where 
social norms are indeterminate); Bernstein, supra note 151, at 599–603 (arguing that formal 
agreements play a role in fostering bilateral reputational constraints). 
 158 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note 151, at 1377. The depth of the interconnections 
can be extensive when one considers that many high-technology collaborations face multiple 
exchange hazards. In an environment of multidimensional exchange hazards, formal and informal 
governance mechanisms can become “multivalent,” in the sense that they interact simultaneously 
with more than one type of hazard. Jennejohn, supra note 19. By design, that braid extends to all 
areas of the contractual relationship. Professor Bernstein makes this point in her study of network 
governance in supply chain relationships, where she notes that informal governance’s “disciplining 
effect can extend to all of the commitments made in a contracting relationship, not just those whose 
violation would give the breached-against party a credible threat to sue.” Bernstein, supra note 151, 
at 603. 
 159 WHITFORD, supra note 116. 
 160 Bernstein, supra note 151. 
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commodity pieces.161 However, when suppliers are producing customized 
components, the parties use additional formal mechanisms. For example, the 
original equipment manufacturers provide regular formal training programs 
for suppliers and implement quality control systems and assessments to 
monitor improvement.162 Those additional mechanisms transform what 
might otherwise be a modular arrangement into an integrated contractual 
system, where the parties use formal contracts, informal training, and 
assessment to promote innovation and quality improvements. These tools 
affect all aspects of the production relationship, from research and 
development to manufacturing and marketing, and in turn intertwine with 
the master agreement and individual purchase orders. 
Bernstein found that relational contracts are also integrated in another 
way: formal agreements help clarify the differences between innocent 
mistakes and opportunistic behavior.163 This clarification, in turn, helps 
parties develop bilateral reputational constraints—trust, in other words—
with each other. The dynamic Bernstein identifies is similar in spirit to 
braiding. However, Bernstein adds an additional layer of complexity by 
observing that the parties’ position with the network of suppliers provides an 
additional source of constraint that complements bilateral informal 
constraints.164 In other words, the extent of integration in relational 
contracting becomes even deeper in Bernstein’s analysis. In other examples 
of relational contracting, parties combine formal contracts and informal 
sanctions. Bernstein expands those interactions to three institutions: formal 
contracts, informal sanctions, and what she refers to as “network 
governance.”165 Bernstein notes that informal governance’s effect can 
“extend to all of the commitments made in a contracting relationship, not just 
[certain major ones].”166 In other words, the interaction between formal and 
informal mechanisms in relational contracting is holistic, and dividing one 
from the other is difficult, if not impossible. 
 
 161 Id. at 566 (describing the supplier relationships, which are governed by a combination of 
master supply agreements and purchase orders. Master supply agreements “omit a quantity 
provision. They are, therefore, legally unenforceable until a purchase order specifying a quantity is 
sent and accepted”). 
 162 Id. at 574 (noting that original equipment manufacturers “seek to exercise control and 
oversight over their suppliers’ labor force in many ways. For example, they require particular 
supplier employees to participate in buyer- (or in some instances supplier-) run training programs”). 
 163 Id. at 578. 
 164 Id. at 609 (noting that “the network structure of a market, the firms’ places in that structure, 
and the local network around each firm all affect the self-enforcing range of the parties’ contractual 
commitments—potentially broadening it well beyond the bilaterally generated self-enforcing range 
as traditionally defined”). 
 165 Id. at 599. 
 166 Id. at 603. 
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The picture emerging from the research on complementarity in 
relational contracting is of highly integrated contractual systems. Whereas 
the substitutionary thesis sees a clean separation between formal and 
informal contracting, the complementarity thesis advanced in recent research 
argues that formal and informal governance are densely interwoven. 
3. Hybrid Design: The Modern M&A Deal 
Modern M&A deals blend aspects of modularity and integration to 
create a fascinating hybrid. Consider the central contract of an M&A deal: 
the acquisition agreement. An acquisition agreement is, in many ways, highly 
integrated—many individual provisions are highly connected to each other. 
The Pfizer–Wyeth material adverse change clause, for example, is dense 
with connections to other provisions in the contract, and to defined terms 
within the contract. Those other provisions and defined terms are, in turn, 
also highly connected to other provisions and defined terms.167 
Other provisions within the acquisition agreement are also highly 
integrated—even those provisions that appear modular are often integrated. 
Representations and warranties are drafted using a modular process but are 
actually highly integrated with the rest of the agreement. In an M&A 
agreement, each party makes representations and warranties about 
themselves—for example, that it has right and title to all intellectual property 
relevant to the deal.168 In terms of the workflow and the drafting process, 
representations and warranties appear modular. Because representations and 
warranties usually pertain to some technical subject matter, such as 
intellectual property, tax, or antitrust, M&A attorneys most often ask 
specialist attorneys to draft them, after which the M&A attorney adds them 
back into the acquisition agreement.169 However, despite this modular 
workflow—cutting out a piece of the contract, working on it in isolation from 
the rest of the contract, then reintegrating it into the contract—
representations and warranties are not modular provisions. Specialists do not 
draft their sections without consulting the rest of the contract—rather, they 
ensure that the provisions conform with the rest of the contract’s defined 
terms, cross-references, and style. Representations and warranties are, thus, 
drafted using a modular workflow style, but the end result is one that is 
highly integrated with other parts of the agreement.170 
 
 167 See discussion of Pfizer–Wyeth deal, supra Section I.C. 
 168 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1418–19 (describing the intellectual property representation and 
warranty in a recent acquisition agreement). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. (describing the process by which specialist-driven representations and warranties are 
drafted, and how they interact with other parts of the agreement). 
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While many provisions within a particular agreement are highly 
integrated, the M&A deal as a whole is often modular. In most modern M&A 
deals, parties use multiple agreements to document the deal.171 At the center 
is the central acquisition agreement.172 A variety of related and necessary 
ancillary agreements support and supplement the central acquisition 
agreement. Those ancillary agreements might include employment 
agreements for key employees,173 leases that make tax-advantageous real 
estate investment trust separations operationally seamless,174 and escrow 
agreements that involve relevant parties to lubricate the deal process.175 Like 
in the OTC derivatives context, the Harley manufacturing context, or the 
securities shelf registration statement context, it is easiest to think of the 
central acquisition agreement as a hub and ancillary agreement as nodes. 
These nodes are, in many ways, self-contained and stand-alone in both 
substance and structure. Consider a key employee agreement that is executed 
in conjunction with an M&A deal. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure 
that a particular employee who is central to the target company’s business 
agrees to work for the acquiring company for some time, at a certain 
compensation.176 The key employee agreement is a contract, separate and 
apart from the acquisition agreement: it has offer, acceptance, and 
consideration. It pertains to a particular subject matter—the employment of 
employee Jane, a key employee of Target Corp., by acquiring company 
Buyer Corp. Although the employment agreement only exists because 
Target Corp. is being purchased by Buyer Corp., the parties signing the 
employment agreement are different from those signing the acquisition 
agreement: Target Corp. is unlikely to be involved in Jane’s employment 
agreement with Buyer Corp. This difference in parties further differentiates 
the employment agreement from the acquisition agreement. 
 
 171 Id. at 1410 (noting that many bargains are “unbundled bargains [that] cohere around a central 
agreement, but are also governed by many side agreements that, together with the central agreement, 
form a whole deal,” and describing M&A deals as ones where “sophisticated commercial parties 
represented by competent advisors choose how to allocate deal provisions between an acquisition 
agreement and ancillary agreements”). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. at 1415 (describing the use of key employee agreements in certain M&A deals); see also 
John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 293–301 (2013) (describing the 
process by which Silicon Valley technology companies acquired talented key employees by 
purchasing the entire company). 
 174 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1415–16 (describing the sale-leaseback process for real estate 
investment trust separations). 
 175 Id. at 1414–15 (describing the use of an escrow agreement to hold part of the purchase price 
in escrow). 
 176 Id. at 1419. 
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Moreover, even as a workflow matter, different attorneys work on the 
employment agreement and the acquisition agreement. An employment 
lawyer will draft and negotiate the employment agreement, while an M&A 
lawyer will likely take the lead on the acquisition agreement.177 This is true 
of many ancillary agreements involving technical, specialized areas of law: 
tax agreements will likely be stand-alone and drafted by tax counsel (and 
involve a subset of the acquisition agreement’s parties), and intellectual 
property assignment agreements will likely be the purview of intellectual 
property counsel (and relevant parties). Perhaps unintuitively, these simple 
agreements are also susceptible to being modularized.178 In particular, in 
large M&A teams, the senior attorney in charge of the deal often assigns 
simpler, more boilerplate agreements, such as the escrow agreement, to 
junior associates. This assignment system reduces costs for the client, 
because junior associates’ work is billed at a lower rate.179 
Although ancillary agreements are very self-contained, they have 
enough connection to other parts of the main deal that they are modules of 
the main M&A deal, rather than entirely different deals of their own. 
Ancillary agreements often share definitions with the acquisition agreement, 
or otherwise refer to the acquisition agreement as a place to look for 
particular provision clarifications.180 It is this small degree of cross-
referencing to the acquisition agreement (or other deal contracts) that makes 
M&A ancillary agreements hybrid agreements that fall along the modular–
integrated spectrum.181 
Many ancillary agreements are fundamentally connected with 
acquisition agreements, even if, as a drafting matter, there are few cross- 
references. Many of these agreements simply would not exist but for the 
acquisition agreement. A transition services agreement is a good example: a 
buyer may decide that it needs transaction support from the seller to make 
the deal worthwhile—and the nature of those transition services is 
memorialized in a transition services agreement.182 Although the transition 
 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. at 1423–26 (discussing simple modules of the deal that contain boilerplate or that are 
simple to draft). 
 179 See id. at 1417–26 (distinguishing between “complex modules,” which are separated so they 
can be drafted by specialist attorneys with expertise in technical areas of the law, and “simple 
modules,” which are simple, boilerplates parts of the deal that are often assigned to junior associates 
in order to economize on lawyer time and fees). 
 180 Id. at 1419 (“[E]mployment agreements may refer to the acquisition agreement . . . .” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 181 Triantis notes that “[c]ontracts are modular to the degree that their parts can be drafted and read 
without adjustment or reference to other parts of the contract.” Triantis, supra note 22, at 191. 
 182 Hwang, supra note 21, at 1415. 
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services agreement is a stand-alone agreement that can (largely) be the M&A 
deal, parties would not enter into it without also executing a related 
acquisition agreement that makes the transition services necessary. Another 
pertinent example of this dynamic between ancillary and acquisition 
agreements is the lease that parties sign in conjunction with a real estate 
investment trust separation deal. In these separations, a company with 
substantial real estate assets—a hotel chain, for example—cleaves itself in 
two: an operations company and a property holding company. The hotel 
chain then sells the property holding company to a real estate investment 
trust—a type of tax-advantageous entity.183 The real estate investment trust 
then leases the same exact property back to the hotel chain’s operating 
company. The lease is absolutely essential to the deal—without it, the hotel 
chain would end up owning an operations company, but not own any real 
estate in which to have those operations. But the lease also would not exist 
without the underlying deal. Thus, the lease is self-contained as a module, 
but also has important, essential connections to the rest of the deal.184 
 
*          *          * 
While this Part has discussed the paradigmatic examples of modular, 
integrated, and hybrid contract design, it takes no normative position on 
which of these designs is best. Scholars in the rules/standards space have 
argued compellingly that there is a place for rules and there is a place for 
standards—they serve different purposes, and contract drafters can rationally 
use either, or even both.185 This Article takes that approach to understanding 
modular, integrated, or hybrid contract design: there is a place for each, they 
serve different purposes, and parties can rationally choose different designs 
(even within the same document) depending on their needs. While plenty of 
work remains to be done to parse the pros and cons of contract structures186 
and to figure out when to use each, this Article sets that question aside for 
future study. Instead, it has a rather more modest goal: to suggest that, in 
 
 183 Id. 
 184 It is worth noting that in these separation agreements, the parties actually enter into a master 
lease agreement that sets forth the majority of the deal terms—but those deal terms are modified 
over time with a series of amendments in which they might change, for instance, the price of the 
rental. In that way, the master lease agreement itself, along with its amendments, is a good example 
of modular design. Structurally, master lease agreements (and their amendments) bear strong 
similarity to master supply agreements (and their purchase orders). See supra Section II.B.1. 
 185 See Choi & Triantis, supra note 28, at 852 (discussing the rules–standards dichotomy with 
regard to the timing of contracting costs); Scott & Triantis, supra note 14, at 839–48 (noting that 
parties can use rules or standards to lower contracting costs). 
 186 Other scholars have discussed, to some extent, the benefits of modularity and integration. See 
Hwang, supra note 21; Triantis, supra note 22. 
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addition to diving into a provision-by-provision analysis of whether a 
particular provision is a rule or a standard, it is also important to understand, 
on a systemic level, whether a contract is modular, integrated, or a hybrid. 
That understanding will help to inform interpretation (and design)—the 
importance of which is discussed in Part III. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT THEORY AND DEAL DESIGN 
Deal structure has important implications for how complex agreements 
are interpreted. The most important, and perhaps longest-debated, issue in 
contract interpretation is the parol evidence debate: whether courts should 
use extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous contracts. Recent work has 
argued that courts should toggle between textualist and contextualist 
interpretive approaches depending on whether parties use rule-like or 
standard-like terms. That research, however, overlooks the important role 
deal structure plays in interpretation. Parties can use rules and standards to 
shift transaction costs between the ex ante design stage and the ex post 
enforcement stage, but their ability to do so depends on how a complex 
contract is structured. In complex contractual systems, it is more difficult to 
shift transaction costs between the front and back ends because rules and 
standards are deeply intertwined. Invocation of a rule often necessarily 
implicates a related standard, and vice versa. 
This Part discusses the implications of recognizing that contractual 
systems are complex and often interconnected. Section A shows how three 
key doctrines—interpretive consistency, indefiniteness, and the law of 
severability—provide courts with the tools they need to analyze contractual 
structure. Section B shows how sophisticated parties are already using 
contract structure to meet their needs. Rather than relying entirely upon a 
court’s ability to apply the default doctrines discussed in Section A, 
sophisticated parties often privately order dispute resolution in a way that 
reflects the underlying structure of the agreement. This Section uses 
examples from M&A and biotechnology collaborations to show how 
parties design dispute resolution provisions in their agreements that 
modularize the enforcement process. Those provisions provide that a 
specialist arbitrator will deal with more technical disputes arising from a 
discrete module within the agreement, while generalist courts will deal with 
disputes involving integrated collections of provisions that require analyzing 
a wider range of legal issues. This privately ordered modularization of 
dispute resolution lends support to the argument that deal structure is a key 
element of contract enforcement. 
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A. Amending the Traditional Canon of Contract Interpretation 
Contractual structure is an integral component of contract interpretation 
and should play an important role in any interpretive analysis. Recognizing 
the role structure plays in interpretation helps reinvigorate the debate over 
text versus context, because a contract’s structure can dictate the extent to 
which a court considers extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Courts 
already employ a variety of doctrines that rely on analyzing a contract’s 
structure, and a more systematic and purposeful inquiry into the structure of 
a contract can help perfect judicial interpretation of contractual provisions. 
The principal starting point in contract interpretation is to ascertain the 
intent of the parties.187 The debate between textualist and contextualist modes 
of contract interpretation centers on what evidence a court considers to 
ascertain intent. Textualists argue that courts should look only at evidence 
within the four corners of the contract.188 Contextualists argue that courts 
should look to extrinsic evidence, such as course of performance, course of 
dealing, or trade usage, to determine meaning.189 Another way to think about 
textualism and contextualism is that textualism restricts the information 
courts consider, while contextualism does just the opposite.190 
Much of the debate between textualists and contextualists turns on how 
well one believes courts can actually read commercial agreements. 
Arguments in this debate tend to be unwavering in nature—each side makes 
absolute claims about judges’ ability to understand contractual language.191 
 
 187 Greenfield v. Philles Records, Inc., 780 N.E.2d 166, 170 (N.Y. 2002) (noting that “[t]he 
fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord 
with the parties’ intent”). 
 188 See supra Section I.B. 
 189 See supra Section I.B. 
 190 Although pure versions of either side of the debate have been advanced and, at times, pursued 
in judicial opinions, the primary approach in the United States is a blended two-step interpretive 
process, by which courts first determine whether the written agreement at issue is ambiguous. If no 
ambiguity exists, then the court does not consult contractual context and relies only upon a reading 
of the agreement’s text. If, however, an ambiguity is found in the written agreement, then the court 
proceeds to the second step, which is to consult contextual evidence of the parties’ intentions. See, 
e.g., Klein v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 569 N.Y.S.2d 838, 842 (App. Div. 1991) (“If 
[contract language] is found to be ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence is admissible to resolve the 
ambiguity.”); W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that 
the court will not look at extrinsic evidence because the provision in the contract is unambiguous); 
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Wesolowski, 305 N.E.2d 907, 909 (N.Y. 1973) (stating that, if there 
is ambiguity, the court will look to extrinsic evidence). 
 191 See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
113:279 (2018) Deal Structure 
323 
As such, the debate has largely stagnated, and leading commentators have 
begun calling for a paradigm shift.192 
Recognizing contractual complexity helps chart a course beyond the 
increasingly stale text-versus-context debate. Modern research by Professors 
Scott and Triantis, and others, has taken an important step toward dislodging 
the stalemate, and shows there may be room for both approaches.193 In fact, 
parties can choose between textualism and contextualism based on how they 
design their contracts.194 Rules signal that parties have included all relevant 
information in a contract, and that courts should use textualism. Standards 
indicate the opposite.195 
Scott and Triantis’s elegant argument is important because it identifies 
contract drafters, ex ante, as the ones who decide whether to subject 
themselves to textualism or contextualism. This is a significant departure 
from previous scholarship, which focused on whether courts (and the market 
of contract dispute parties, more generally) would benefit more from 
textualism or contextualism.196 In a sense, Scott and Triantis’s view causes 
the classic text/context debate to recede into the background. Rather than 
debating the relative merits of each, the new normative question becomes 
how to facilitate the case-by-case optimization of interpretive rules 
according to the design choices of the parties to a given deal. 
Scott and Triantis’s theory depends upon an important condition, 
however. Because deals have complex structures, provisions are 
intertwined—some rules are closely tied to standards, and vice versa. The 
combination of rules and standards complicates parties’ ability to carefully 
shift between front-end and back-end transaction costs. Scott and Triantis 
proceed largely on the assumption that each rule and standard operates in 
isolation, so that each rule or standard does not interact with other parts of 
the contract. However, in Cooper Tire and other modern cases, isolation of 
contract provisions cannot be taken for granted.197 When provisions are 
intertwined, shifting costs between the ex ante design stage and the ex post 
 
 192 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Text Versus Context: The Failure of the Unitary Law of Contract 
Interpretation, in THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW 312 (F.H. Buckley ed., 
2013). 
 193 See supra Section I.A. 
 194 Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 
6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 11, 28, 33 (2009); Choi & Triantis, supra note 28; Scott & Triantis, supra 
note 14. 
 195 Scott & Triantis, supra note 14, at 827–31 (discussing how parties, ex ante, design contracts 
while keeping in mind ex post litigation costs); see also Choi & Triantis, supra note 28, at 852 
(noting that if the probability of ex post litigation is low, then parties might reasonably defer 
contracting costs to the back end by drafting vague provisions ex ante). 
 196 See supra Part I. 
 197 See supra Section I.C. 
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enforcement stage is more challenging. Often, connections between a rule-
like term and a standard-like term will blur the distinction between the two 
types of provisions, effectively making cost-shifting a murkier process. 
One of contractual structuralism’s main contributions is that it provides 
a framework for analyzing the internal structure of a contract system, thereby 
alleviating some of that murkiness. Analyzing a contract’s structure allows 
courts to understand the interactions between provisions. When a court 
understands whether a contractual system is modular or integrated, it can 
also better determine the scope of the interpretive exercise: whether it should 
interpret a single module on a stand-alone basis or a more integrated 
collection of terms that are meant to be read together. 
Existing doctrinal tools may already help courts undertake structural 
analysis. Although contract scholarship routinely overlooks structure, in 
practice, courts already regularly look for contract structure in at least three 
ways. First, courts interpreting complex agreements invoke the doctrine that 
provisions within the same contract or collection of contracts must be 
interpreted consistently.198 In order to interpret a provision consistently over 
several documents, judges must already assess the structure of a contractual 
system and understand how the various obligations fit together. 
The doctrine of indefiniteness, too, provides another opportunity to 
consider structure. For instance, under the Uniform Commercial Code, when 
a contract is too indefinite—that is, it leaves too many terms unspecified—
the court may find that the parties have not formed a contract.199 There is no 
predetermined threshold at which a court knows that an alleged contract is 
too indefinite; rather, the judge must assess the entire collection of promises 
in an analysis that essentially asks whether the contractual system is 
sufficiently complete.200 In determining whether a contract is indefinite, then, 
a court must also review contract structure. 
 
 198 See, e.g., GMG Cap. Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 779 
(2012) (holding that the meaning inferred from a particular contract provision cannot control the 
meaning of the entire agreement if such an inference conflicts with the agreement’s overall scheme 
or plan); see also Westminster Secs. Corp. v. Petrocom Energy Ltd., No. 11-607-cv, 2012 WL 
147917, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2012) (“The rules of contract construction require us to adopt an 
interpretation which gives meaning to every provision of the contract” (quoting Paneccasio v. 
Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 532 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2008))). 
 199 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017–2018) (“Even though 
one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have 
intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate 
remedy.”). 
 200 ATA Airlines, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 665 F.3d 882, 887 (7th Cir. 2011) (conducting a 
highly case-specific analysis and finding that the omission of crucial terms rendered a contract 
unenforceable under the doctrine of indefiniteness). 
113:279 (2018) Deal Structure 
325 
Finally, courts’ frequent enforcement of severability provisions 
implicitly acknowledges that some contracts have a modular structure.201 A 
severability provision specifies that should one provision of the contract be 
found unenforceable, other parts can still be enforced. But severability 
provisions only work—that is, provisions can only physically be separated—
if they are distinct modules. If a provision is too integrated with the rest of 
the contract, it simply cannot be separated, even if a severability provision 
(which would usually allow a part of the contract to be excised) exists and is 
found enforceable. 
When applying each of these doctrines, judges are asked—implicitly—
to analyze contract structure. Judges have done so competently, which 
suggests that they are already well familiar with contractual structure, at least 
in a tacit sense. What judges have been lacking, and what contract theory has 
thus far failed to supply, is a coherent and comprehensive theory of how 
contractual structure should shape their assessments. A more cohesive theory 
of contractual structuralism provides a way to fill that gap. 
Doctrines such as the consistency maxim, indefiniteness, and the 
enforceability of severability provisions do not work in a vacuum, of course. 
They precede the core interpretive doctrines—such as the parol evidence 
rule, assessing course of performance and dealing, and considering trade 
usage—in a threshold fashion. Doctrines for assessing deal structure provide 
a secondary throttle for controlling the amount of information analyzed when 
interpreting an agreement. For instance, suppose that parties dispute a 
particular contract, and the judge determines that the issue implicates a single 
or limited number of provisions. That determination—that the dispute can be 
resolved by considering only a few modules—circumscribes the scope of the 
court’s interpretive inquiry by limiting the provisions at issue and, perhaps, 
making textual interpretation more feasible. On the other hand, finding that 
a complex agreement is an integrated system opens up a more wide-ranging 
analysis, likely compounding the costs arising from interpreting the 
agreement. In those respects, the structural analysis sets the boundaries for a 
subsequent textual or contextual analysis of the provisions at issue. 
Contract structure’s effect on interpretation is subtle. Consider the 
famous Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp. decision.202 
There, a central issue was how to interpret the standard-like material adverse 
effect provision in the merger agreement. In its decision, the court rejected 
Hexion’s interpretation because such interpretation would, in the words of 
 
 201 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 184 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., Gannon v. 
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 2001) (severing an arbitration provision from an 
otherwise enforceable agreement). 
 202 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008). 
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the court, “eviscerate, if not render altogether void,” the meaning of a 
tenuously connected rule-like provision in another part of the agreement.203 
In other words, the merger agreement’s highly integrated structure limited 
the court’s ability to adopt Hexion’s interpretation of a particular integrated 
provision. 
Contract structure can also amplify the court’s interpretive scope, 
however. This was the case in CA, Inc. v. Ingres Corp., a recent Delaware 
Court of Chancery case.204 There, the court considered conflicting provisions 
in a collection of agreements governing Ingres’s spinoff from CA.205 The 
parties had entered into at least two spinoff-related agreements. The earlier 
agreement provided that CA could receive new releases of Ingres’s database 
software for free.206 A later contract required CA to pay for new releases. The 
parties disputed whether the later contract was sufficiently broad such that it 
effectively renegotiated the terms of the earlier one.207 If each of these 
contracts had been more modular and self-contained, they might have each 
invited the court to take only a textualist approach to interpretation. Because 
the contracts had provisions that directly competed with each other, however, 
the court was forced to consider context. In this case, the court eventually 
concluded that extrinsic evidence suggested that the later agreement 
controlled.208 The effect was a broad refashioning of the exchange 
relationship—a refashioning that would not have occurred if the parties had 
made the two contracts more modular. 
By introducing a second way to calibrate the amount of information a 
court can analyze, this Article introduces an important and wide avenue for 
future research. As the Hexion v. Huntsman and CA v. Ingres examples 
suggest, the interactions between the structural and substantive interpretive 
throttles are complicated. Much work remains to be done before scholars, 
courts, and practitioners can fully understand those interactions and how they 
 
 203 Id. at 741. 
 204 No. 4300-VCS, 2009 WL 4575009 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 205 Id. Notably, one of the contract interpretation issues, whether Ingres was obligated to provide 
a recently released version of its database software as an “update” under the original divestiture 
agreements, provides another example of the consistency maxim constraining the scope of judicial 
intervention, because the court referenced the definition of “update” in one contract and the 
definition of “enhancement” in a contemporaneous agreement. Id. at *26–29. 
 206 Id. at *1–4. 
 207 Id. at *29–33. 
 208 Id. at *33. The court noted that, under California contract law, which controlled the 
subsequent contract, a contextual analysis was required, but that the outcome would have been the 
same under New York law, which controlled the earlier divestiture agreements, because of the 
ambiguity arising from the conflict between the plain language of the contracts in question. Id. at 
*29–30. 
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may affect parties’ incentives both at the ex ante drafting stage and in ex post 
enforcement. 
In the meantime, however, one path forward is clear: contract structure 
should be a first-step inquiry for courts interpreting contracts. In modern 
contracting, where structure—not just substance—helps document parties’ 
intent, ignoring structure is tantamount to ignoring evidence of parties’ 
intent. Without an understanding of structure, it is impossible to 
appropriately focus upon either text or context—and without solving that 
first-order line-drawing problem, there is no true text/context debate to be 
had. 
B. Privately Ordered Modularity in Dispute Resolution 
Some deal parties, too, have begun to design contract structure to affect 
enforcement. The design of dispute resolution provisions provides a 
particularly interesting glimpse into this practice. 
Complex agreements, such as alliance contracts and M&A agreements, 
frequently modularize and delegate disputes between multiple courts or 
arbitrators.209 That is, parties separate contract provisions, and then indicate 
that certain courts and arbitrators are assigned to resolve different provisions. 
The complex dispute resolution system adopted in an alliance between 
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Anacor provides an intriguing example. Ex 
ante, the parties’ contract established an intricate collection of committees to 
oversee the collaboration.210 First, they created a general Joint Research 
Committee—the collaboration’s governing body. In addition, they organized 
two subcommittees: a Joint Project Team to oversee day-to-day project 
progress, and a Joint Patent Subcommittee for patent matters.211 In addition 
to the modularized committees, the parties appointed managers to liaise 
between the parties.212 
The parties’ alliance agreement established an equally complex dispute 
resolution process atop that committee structure. Disputes are resolved either 
internally or through an external tribunal, depending on the subject matter. 
Patent disputes are first reviewed by the Joint Patent Subcommittee. If the 
Subcommittee is unable to resolve the issue, the matter is escalated to the 
 
 209 Jennejohn, supra note 19, at 359; see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, 
Unbundling Procedure: Carve-outs from Arbitration Clauses, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1966–69 
(2014) (analyzing the use of bifurcated dispute resolution provisions in a variety of agreement types). 
 210 Research and Development Collaboration, Option and License Agreement between 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline and Anacor Pharm., Inc. §§ 3.1–3.3. 
 211 Id. §§ 3.2, 3.3. The Joint Research Committee was also authorized to create additional 
subcommittees as necessary. Id. § 3.1.7. 
 212 Id. § 3.4. 
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Joint Research Committee, and then to a federal patent court. Project 
disputes follow a similar path, but terminate with a single external 
arbitrator, rather than with a federal court. Contract disputes have no initial 
Subcommittee review. Instead, they skip directly to the Joint Research 
Committee, then to the companies’ two chief operating officers, and then to 
a three-person panel of arbitrators. 
Intriguingly, the agreement trifurcates the final-review institutions: 
depending on subject matter, the final reviewers could be a federal court, 
three-expert arbitration, or single-expert arbitration. When designing this 
dispute resolution system, GSK and Anacor did not make the traditional 
either/or choice between arbitration or public courts. Rather, they cobbled 
together a collection of enforcement institutions and tailored their respective 
remits according to the type of issue in dispute. Separating adjudication was 
likely an attempt to maximize chances for injunctive relief and to leverage 
court and arbitrator expertise. Federal courts, for example, have specialized 
experience in patent law—so it makes sense to send the most challenging 
patent disputes to federal court. 
A similar phenomenon occurs in M&A. Parties often modularize their 
dispute resolution by specifying that the forum of dispute resolution depends 
on which portion of the contract is at issue. For example, it is common in 
private M&A deals to send pre-closing disputes to Delaware’s specialized 
business law courts, where injunctive relief is readily available. Pre-closing 
disputes might include contract disagreements between the parties or suits 
from shareholders alleging misconduct on the part of the parties or their 
boards of directors.213 Pre-closing disputes, by definition, stand in the way of 
closing; thus, parties welcome swift resolution through injunction so that 
they can move on closing the deal. 
Post-closing disputes, which commonly involve monetary damages that 
are easily arbitrable, are often sent to a private tribunal or even to an 
accounting firm. Frequently, separation occurs in private M&A deals 
involving contingent consideration—such as a purchase price adjustment or 
 
 213 M&A parties have long found shareholder suits filed in between an M&A deal’s signing and 
closing to be a nuisance. These suits usually allege that the M&A parties have not disclosed enough 
information about the M&A deal, and the parties and the shareholder settle for lawyers’ fees and 
additional securities disclosure. By funneling all such disputes to company-friendly courts of equity, 
such as the Delaware Chancery Court, M&A parties can swiftly settle these suits and move on to 
closing the deal—which is what both the parties want. Since 2016’s Trulia decision in Delaware, 
however, the number of M&A disclosure-only settlement suits has dramatically decreased. See In re 
Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 894 (Del. Ch. 2016) (containing a discussion of 
disclosure-only settlement suits). 
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an earnout.214 In those cases, parties often note that consideration disputes 
will be sent to an expert arbitrator, while other disputes arising out of the 
contract will be heard in a state or federal court.215 
The Viacom–Harmonix M&A deal was a typical example of 
enforcement bifurcation. In 2006, Viacom acquired Harmonix Music 
Systems, which produced then-popular video games, such as Guitar Hero 
and Rock Band, for $175 million in cash.216 The consideration was subject to 
an initial purchase price adjustment, and Viacom could pay Harmonix 
additional future payments—an earnout payment—contingent upon the 
target’s post-acquisition financial performance.217 
The agreement carefully identified, on a granular, provision-by-
provision level, which adjudicators would resolve which types of disputes. 
Disputes related to the purchase price adjustment and earnout were 
specifically separated from the rest of the contract: they would be resolved 
by accounting firm Deloitte & Touche.218 All other disputes were to be 
 
 214 Purchase price adjustments and earnouts are tools that parties commonly use in private M&A 
deals to adjust the purchase price. In both cases, the seller receives more or less consideration depending 
on whether certain conditions are met. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business 
Lawyers in the 21st Century, 15 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 5 (2014). 
 215 Richard Hall & Matthias M. Pitkowitz, Tailor-Made—Unique Dispute Resolution Clauses 
in M&A Agreements, 5 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. L. 29, 31 (2012); Robert B. Little & Greg Odegaard, 
Drafting Dispute Resolution Provisions in Purchase Price Adjustment Clauses, GIBSON DUNN M&A 
REPORT 5 (2014), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/publications/ 
MAReport-Winter2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR69-H3KA] (“The vast majority of M&A contracts 
contain [purchase price adjustment provisions] calling for purchase price disputes to be resolved 
using a single accountant.”); see also Wolfgang Peter, Arbitration of Mergers and Acquisitions: 
Purchase Price Adjustment Disputes, 19 ARB. INT’L 491, 501 (2003). For an analysis of purchase 
price adjustment clauses, dispute resolution through expert accountants, and issues arising relating 
to arbitrability, see New York City Bar Committee on International Commercial Disputes, Purchase 
Price Adjustment Clauses and Expert Determinations: Legal Issues, Practical Problems and 
Suggested Improvements (2013), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072551-
PurchasePriceAdjustmentClausesExpertDeterminations--
LegalIssuesPracticalProblemsSuggestedImprovements.pdf [https://perma.cc/W87S-AVQP]. 
 216 Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Winshall, No. 7149-CS, 2012 WL 3249620 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2012). 
 217 Id. at *2. 
 218 Exhibit A to Verified Amended Complaint: Agreement and Plan of Merger §§ 2.3–2.4, 
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. Winshall, 55 A.3d 629 (Del. Ch. 2011) (No. 6074-VCS) (noting that “[i]n 
connection with any dispute resolution regarding the [purchase price adjustment, either party] will 
be entitled to submit such unresolved disagreements (the ‘Disagreements’) to Deloitte & Touche, 
LLP or, if such firm is unable or unwilling to resolve any such Disagreements, such other nationally 
recognized firm of independent certified public accountants mutually acceptable to [the parties] (the 
‘Resolution Accountants’)”). The agreement carefully limited Deloitte’s remit, however. It noted 
that “[t]he scope of [Deloitte’s] engagement (which shall not be an audit) shall be limited to the 
resolution of the [consideration-related disagreements], and the recalculation of the [purchase price 
adjustment] in light of such resolution . . . .” Id. § 2.3(b). The scope of Deloitte’s review in the event 
of an earnout dispute was identical. See id. § 2.4 (“The scope of the Resolution Accountants 
engagement (which shall not be an audit) shall be limited to the resolution of the Earn-Out 
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adjudicated in either state or federal courts in Delaware subject to Delaware 
law.219 
Separating pre- and post-closing disputes into two different 
adjudicative bodies is important for M&A parties. In particular, this 
modularizing means that M&A parties can organize their disputes so that 
adjudicators can meet the parties’ timing and specialization needs. For pre-
closing disputes, parties need swift resolution from an adjudicator who is 
familiar with contract disputes—so they turn to courts, which can give quick 
injunctive relief and specialist knowledge about legal disputes involving 
contracts. In contrast, for consideration-related disputes, parties do not need 
such swift resolution. Rather, because consideration-related disputes are 
often premised on the technical nitty-gritty of how accounting statements 
have been prepared, parties prefer to seek the assistance of subject matter 
experts—accountants. In a way, by modularizing dispute resolution, parties 
are better able to resolve disputes while maximizing for more granular 
preferences. 
CONCLUSION 
Existing contract scholarship tries to understand contracts by using a 
provision-by-provision analysis when modern commercial agreements are 
complex collections of provisions. The classic rules/standards and 
text/context frameworks overlook the fundamental role of structure in 
complex contracts. 
This Article develops a new theory of contractual structuralism to bring 
contract theory up to date with modern practice. It shows how parties weave 
provisions and agreements in modern exchange relationships. How the 
provisions in a complex agreement are organized—that is, how they are 
structured—has important implications for theory, doctrine, and practice. In 
particular, understanding a contract’s structure as modular, integrated, or a 
hybrid mixture can help courts more accurately ascertain parties’ intent, and 
also help parties better design contracts to mitigate risk and tailor 
enforcement. While this Article focuses on complex commercial deals, the 
theory of contractual structuralism has broad applicability and aims to align 





Disagreements, and the recalculation of the 2007 Earn-Out Payment or 2008 Earn-Out Payment, as 
the case may be, in light of such resolution . . . .”). 
 219 Id. § 10.10. 
